IOE ASSET BANNER

Development Project for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples (2004)

03 December 2004

Interim evaluation1

Introduction

The design of the Development Project for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples (PRODEPINE) ties in with the government strategy for sustainable development that calls for preservation of the identity of the 12 nationalities and peoples of Ecuador in the country's three regions: the coastal areas, the Sierra, and the Amazon. The project covers 19 of Ecuador's 22 provinces, 108 of the 213 cantons, and 434 of the 788 rural parishes. The population covered by the project is approximately 1 440 000, including 1 346 000 indigenous and 94 000 Afro-Ecuadorians in 4 748 communities, surpassing the original target by 57%. Project results indicate that resources are concentrated in the Sierra region, where most of the indigenous population lives, represented by the Kichwa de la Sierra nationality.

PRODEPINE was co-financed by IFAD (USD 15 million), the World Bank (USD 25 million) and the Government of Ecuador (USD 10 million). The World Bank completed its part of the operation in December 2002. Investments as of 30 April 2004 stood at USD 14 213 50, leaving a balance of USD 1 349 048 to be disbursed by 30 June 2004.

Design features and implementation results

The objectives set for PRODEPINE have been maintained throughout the project:

  1. strengthen the technical, administrative, and managerial capacity of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities at the local, regional, and national levels in order to promote more effective participation in official policy-setting and improve the provision of economic services to those communities;

  2. achieve the democratic integration of indigenous and black peoples, incorporating their own development vision and leveraging their current resources as well as their human and social capital;

  3. systematize and improve access for project beneficiaries to land and water resources;

  4. increase capacity at local levels to enable community members to take part in identifying, designing, and carrying out productive and social infrastructure projects;

  5. leverage financial resources for productive investments for rural communities, families and individuals; and

  6. strengthen state institutions to create adequate capacity for policy-setting, planning and coordination of activities designed for the target population.

The four project components have not changed, except the rural financial services (RFS) component (fully funded by IFAD) which was redesigned twice to improve conditions for implementation. The components are as follows:

  • Component 1: Institutional strengthening for second- and third-tier indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations
  • Component 2: Support for regularization of land and water rights
  • Component 3: Rural investment and credit
  • Component 4: Institutional strengthening of the Council for Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) and the Development Corporation (CODAE)

Political and institutional changes during implementation. PRODEPINE has been subject to both external and internal political changes. Firstly, the project was carried out during a period of political instability, with three consecutive government administrations. Secondly, the creation of CODENPE as the successor to the National Planning and Development Council for Indigenous and Black Peoples (COMPLADEIN) led to the need to refocus the project on the concept of nationalities and peoples. Despite the tensions generated by these changes, implementation continued successfully. CODENPE was effective as the national counterpart organization representing indigenous peoples. As to the participation of the National and Afro-Ecuadorian Council (CNA) in representing Afro-Ecuadorians, the Council was important as the antecedent to the Council for Afro-Ecuadorian Development (CODAE) whose operational mechanisms are still being set up.

Changes to design during implementation. Both minor and major adjustments were made. Minor design adjustments were made in connection with the "collective rights" of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian nationalities and peoples as stipulated in the new Constitution of 1998. More substantial changes were made to the RFS component in response to external and internal factors such as: (i) the banking crisis of 1999-2001; (ii) communication problems between PRODEPINE and IFAD concerning the component's set-up; and (iii) internal organizational and strategy-related matters within PRODEPINE. Implementation of all the components began in late 1998, except for the RFS sub-component which experienced a delay of two and a half years, causing it to be isolated from the other components and leading to disconnect with financing from the World Bank.

Financial performance of investment of IFAD funds. Following adjustments to exchange rates as a result of the polarization of Ecuador's economy, the amount of IFAD Loan 464-EC stands at USD 14 332 000, financing the following: credit for land purchases, water consulting, rural investments for public benefit (sub-project financing), rural investments for private benefit (private sector), institutional strengthening for CODENPE and CODAE (operating expenses), technical assistance for financial intermediaries, goods for financial intermediaries. The mission recommended a second extension to March 2005 to allow adequate time to disburse the remaining USD 5.2 million of IFAD's funding.

Results of Component 1: Institutional Strengthening for Second-Tier and Third-Tier Organizations (STOs and TTOs). This component, the backbone of the project, is fully funded by the World Bank. The component has strengthened 241 STOs and TTOs in the implementation of 212 local development plans (LDPs) for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people (19% more than planned), benefiting 1 345 500 indigenous and 93 600 Afro-Ecuadorians. The human resources training sub-component has shown positive results. PRODEPINE has financed scholarships for 69 trainees and 335 high-school graduates, as well as 646 local technicians, of whom 43% were women. The cultural heritage sub-component funded 10 publications, videos, seminars, etc. The component includes support for ten indigenous peoples fighting for survival and threatened with extinction: Siona, Secoya, Cofán, Huao, Shiviar, Zápara, Awá, Epera, Chachi and Tsáchila.

Results of Component 2: Support for the Regularization of Land and Water Rights. Under this component, IFAD financed the land purchase sub-component for USD 345 455 (3.7% of IFAD investment), with 634 ha of land purchased benefiting 185 families in eight organizations of the Sierra region (Tungurahua, Imbabura, Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Bolívar). Support for the preparation of 71 land management plans is envisaged by project completion. Land legalization was funded by the World Bank. For land belonging to the National Agricultural Development Institute (INDA), 105 596 ha of land was legalized by means of titles issued to 55 target communities (1 832 beneficiary families). For land belonging to the Environment Ministry, 17 084 ha of land was legalized, benefiting 16 communities (273 families). For the water component, diagnostic assessments were carried out for 458 community irrigation systems (2 647 km) belonging to 37 194 beneficiary families in 793 communities.

Results of Component 3: Rural Investments for Public and Private Benefit. This component includes two sub-components: (i) investments for public benefit or sub-projects (38% IFAD financing, 62% World Bank financing); and (ii) RFS investments for private benefit (100% financed by IFAD).

IFAD investment in the sub-project sub-component was USD 5 204 563: USD 4 467 060 for sub-projects; USD 395 740 for pre-investment; USD 319 720 for technical training; and USD 22 043 for monitoring of sub-projects. Total investment in the component benefited 62 644 families in 103 cantons, 57% more than planned. The sub-projects reached 26% of all indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples. They responded to 33% of requests from grass-roots organizations and involved 1 559 STOs and TTOs. Most of the investment went to the Kichwa nationality (401 sub-projects and USD 7 789 178 or 64.77% of the total investment made by PRODEPINE, covering 270 409 inhabitants). In second place was investment destined for Afro-descendents (71 projects financed with USD 1 708 407 or 14.21% of total investment). Third was investment for the Shuar people (90 sub-projects and USD 1 179 564 or 9.81%), followed by the Achuar nationality (62 projects and USD 497 221 or 4.13% of total investment). Just 7.08% of the total investment, or USD 850 819, went to initiatives initiated by the tribal peoples (Awa, Chachi, Epera, Huaorani, Shiwiar, Tsachila and Zápara).

The RFS sub-component includes the Second-Tier Credit Union Programme (CUP) and the cajas solidarias Village Banking Programme. Rural investments for private benefit totalled USD 3 166 761 or 34.1% of the IFAD investment. As of April 2003, the credit component had reached 62% of the target number of beneficiaries established in the original project design, 58% of the lending target and 85% of contributions to cajas solidarias. Despite the delay in implementation, the evaluation team found that the RFS sub-component showed major achievements in implementation. The mission feels that this sub-component contributed to expanding the supply of micro-financing to low-income sectors that include indigenous and, to a lesser extent, black population groups.

Within the CUP Programme, USD 2.2 million has been disbursed from the IFAD funding: USD 270 000 in member contributions (cash reserves) and USD 371 000 in funding for the 17 credit unions, for a total of USD 2.9 million (USD 959 per beneficiary), distributed to 3 000 families. There is a certain concentration of RFS sub-component activities in the regions of the Sierra (77.2%: 42% Central, 22% South, 13% North) attributable to the institutional and financial capacity of local agencies to take on responsibility for intermediating PRODEPINE funding, followed by the Amazon (11.9%) and Coast (10.9%) regions.

As regards cajas solidarias, close to 15 000 women were served through 626 cajas and total contributions of seed capital reached USD 425 000. Total investment by PRODEPINE was USD 558 000, i.e. an average of USD 912 per caja. The local contribution (mandatory savings to set up a caja) was USD 211 per caja (USD 129 000), which implies that the women have achieved a level of capitalization of 23% over an average period of two years. This is considered a satisfactory result. The cajas are also concentrated in the Sierra region (65%), with the regional Central Sierra office accounting for 48.5%, followed by the Coast with 21.3%, then Amazon with 13.2%.

Results of Component 4: Strengthening of COMPLADEIN (currently CODENPE and CODAE). This component was classed as "satisfactory" by the World Bank project completion report (PCR). Although most of the funding for this component came from the World Bank, IFAD invested USD 583 533, representing 6.2% of the IFAD investment as of 30 April 2003.

Project performance

Generally speaking, the project completion reports drafted by the World Bank and by CODENPE-PRODEPINE have evaluated performance by the four project components as "satisfactory" according to the project completion evaluation parameters of the World Bank and the project executing unit.

Relevance of objectives. The evaluation indicates that the PRODEPINE objectives are highly relevant in responding to the priorities established in diagnostic assessments of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples drawn up during project preparation.

Effectiveness. PRODEPINE has not, in four years, changed living conditions for the 3 695 communities concerned, nor did it set out to do so. However, it has made a very effective contribution to setting up a participatory national planning structure through STOs and TTOs. Thanks to this structure, which combines state institutions with indigenous and black civil society organizations, operating conditions today are much more favourable to implementing such policy. The effectiveness of PRODEPINE has made it possible to visualize, as a natural next step, adjustments that can be made to processes in order to better serve the Coast and Amazon regions.

  • With respect to strengthening of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian institutions, PRODEPINE has been very effective in implementing the state policy of CODENPE (and, to a lesser extent, CODAE) to consolidate and empower indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations and to carry out 152 development plans for STOs and TTOs. This kind of policy has never before been implemented in the history of Ecuador and sets a standard for the rest of Latin America. Nevertheless, the project beneficiaries feel that there are administrative and organizational aspects of implementation that diminish the component's effectiveness. These aspects have to do with political pressures, on the one hand, and the accountability of organizations to communities and the State, on the other.

  • The public investment component has effectively responded to 95% of the priority needs of communities.

  • As to the RFS sub-component, those interviewed corroborate a concern with the line of credit granted through local financial agencies (LFAs). The RFS Division of PRODEPINE considers the transfer of funds to LFAs as efficient and effective. The evaluation, however, indicates that the project's role of facilitating development of the rural financial sector to serve the target population through LFAs is still incipient.

Efficiency. PRODEPINE was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in December 1997 and entered into effect in November 1998, at which point all components began operations except for rural finance and land purchase (both funded by IFAD), which commenced later. Generally speaking, it can be said that PRODEPINE has been moderately efficient in establishing mechanisms and instruments to promote lasting development processes. Through PRODEPINE, CODENPE now has effective instruments to stimulate indigenous development in Ecuador. For example, there is greater knowledge of strategic plans within CODENPE and CODAE. At the level of each nationality there are now participatory tools and a methodology2, as well as instruments to build an organizational and operating structure. It is urgent that these instruments be adapted to the regional environment in order to make them more efficient.

Regarding the public investment component, PRODEPINE has very efficiently put in place processes within indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations, but not in the communities themselves. The field evaluation found that community participation had been limited to setting project priorities and their labour contributions and that training of communities to participate effectively in monitoring and implementation, or social, administrative and financial control of their projects was still incipient.

With respect to RFS, according to those concerned, the cajas solidarias sub-component has been efficient in bringing small loans to the indigenous rural population. As to RFS through CUP, the efficiency of these has been questioned based on the following observations: (i) the interest rate charged to credit unions by the project is three to four percentage points below the market rate, which attracts larger LFAs with no liquidity problems into the financial system. Also, larger credit unions receive a larger proportion of the subsidy and are rewarded with a discount of one point as a performance incentive. (ii) PRODEPINE has selected credit unions with good financial performance, which significantly limits financial risk; and (iii) use of the Bank Watch Rating excludes all LFAs with less-than-good financial performance, even if they have some potential, for both the credit and the strengthening programmes. This policy has had a particular impact on regional offices where the supply of financing has been limited (Amazon and Coast).

Impact on rural poverty

The impact on the country's three regions largely reflects the amount invested. The greatest beneficiaries of this first PRODEPINE have been better organized and more established STOs and TTOs, and these organizations are located in the Sierra. There is a pronounced need for differentiated strategies for the Coast and Amazon.

The impact on material and financial resources is reflected in: (i) the institutional strengthening of CODENPE, CODAE, STOs and TTOs in administrative procedures for management personnel and in office equipment; (ii) the family and community environment of beneficiaries through the social infrastructure sub-projects that make up the community assets (for example: water for human consumption and irrigation, electricity, schools, health centres, day care centres) and productive sub-projects that have raised the value of land holdings and, according to the testimony of beneficiaries interviewed, have also raised family incomes; (iii) the impact of cajas solidarias on rural communities that would otherwise have no access to credit; and (iv) the appreciation of land purchased or legalized and cultivated.

The impact on human resources, by facilitating new skills, is visible mainly among the leaders of indigenous organizations at the national level, in the following areas: project design, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as support for accounting and administrative management, all of which has improved their leadership skills. It is important to recognize, however, that this knowledge does not always trickle down throughout the organization. Training for community human resources in project management and implementation, under the STOs and TTOs, was very limited. On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of RFS on credit unions, since other agencies such as Swiss Contact, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, and the World Organization of Credit Unions (WOCCU) have also invested in the human resources of these credit unions.

The project's impact on social capital and empowering capacity for action by organizations is greater than the impact on social capital of beneficiary communities, which depended largely on each STO or TTO participating, as well as the mechanisms used to put in place the capacity for self-management, monitoring, and social auditing. On the other hand, PRODEPINE supported an increase in the social capital of local networks of paralegals facilitating land arbitration.

Impact on food security was not an explicit project objective. However, families interviewed identified this as one of the project's positive impacts. Even some sub-projects such as schoolrooms, child-feeding centres, shelters and day care centres, have benefited food security by forging strategic alliances with state and private programmes that promote school breakfast and lunch. The land award projects also have an impact on family food security since families then devote time to cultivating and looking after the land.

PRODEPINE has supported the preservation and conservation of the environment, particularly fragile ecosystems such as wild land, andean and tropical forest. However, it is not clear that the management plans prepared are being implemented, since the communities require further training in order to do so.

The impact on institutions, policy, and regulatory frameworks has been significant in supporting the formulation of development plans for CODENPE and CODAE and local development plans (LDPs). Most of the targets have been reached: (i) The "nationalities and peoples act" placed before Congress for adoption; (ii) the "act recognizing traditional health systems"; and (iii) several acts protecting indigenous cultures, childhood and adolescence, judicial administration, bilingual education and civil participation. In order to support the decentralized administration of CODENPE, the component set up and equipped seven regional offices. The project was successful in preparing and presenting to Congress the special Ecuador "biodiversity conservation and sustainable use act".

Impact on women. Since there is no gender strategy included in the project, or any systematic monitoring in the Rikuk Pach information system of participation by men and women in the various components, the gender impact of the project is not clear. As of mid-term, 20 gender promoters had been trained under the cultural heritage sub-component. The cajas solidarias sub-component is devoted exclusively to women. Although the cajas are small in size, their potential social impact is great. Land titling and transfer has helped to empower female heads of household and improve their self-esteem. Evidence was found that the infrastructure, cajas solidarias and scholarships sub-components have empowered women and improved their position within the family and society.

Project sustainability and replicability. At the moment, the project depends on external funding. The national contribution is approximately 10%; however, as of April 2003, the Government of Ecuador had disbursed just 35% of its contribution. The economic and financial sustainability of the infrastructure projects is questionable, since the communities have not been trained to maintain them. The replicability of the project is seen by beneficiaries as an urgent need, since this is the only project of its kind in the country.

Other kinds of impact on poverty. One of the project's greatest achievements is that it promotes the recognition of the political, legal, and physical space that the nationalities and peoples need to occupy in order to overcome their social and economic constraints.

Overall impact evaluation. It can be said that the repercussions of PRODEPINE are significant both in the target population and in the mixed-race population, in terms of: (i) socio-political impact in the country; (ii) impact by providing a window of opportunity to the target population; and (iii) impact by spearheading policy implementation by CODENPE. PRODEPINE designed several participatory instruments and methodologies to evaluate impact, under the Regional Programme for Strengthening Regional Evaluation Capacity (PREVAL) associated with IFAD.

Performance by cooperation agencies IFAD and the World Bank. The mid-term evaluation indicates that coordination between co-financiers IFAD and the World Bank is poor. This may have had some influence on the delay in implementation of the RFS sub-component. The World Bank administered IFAD funds up until 2002, as well as semi-annual supervision exercises of the components co-financed. IFAD took part in some of these. The category reallocation took place in 2003. There is a widespread perception that IFAD has been "absent" at critical decision points since July 2001. Whereas the World Bank had completed its operation (USD 25 million), IFAD had disbursed just USD 9.3 million by April 2003, leaving a balance of USD 5.2 million.

Performance by the Government of Ecuador and its agencies. The project has been successful in supporting CODENPE in setting policies and in promoting their application in the national line ministries, for example, the National Intercultural Bilingual Education Directorate (DINEIB) and the National Indigenous Health Directorate3. The evaluation verified a total appropriation of the project by CODENPE. As to national counterpart funds, given the serious economic and financial crisis, the government was able to cover only 35% of its contribution, which served to defray taxes and pari passu expenses. This had an adverse impact on the components that depend on counterpart funding, such as the land purchase and titling and water rights studies sub-components. However, the rural investment for public benefit component, 36% of which was financed by IFAD, commenced on schedule thanks to contributions from beneficiaries. Implementation of the land purchase component was affected by the elimination of the Ecuadorian Forestry Institute for Nature and Wildlife and its replacement by the Ministry of Environment as the governing oversight agency for sustainable environmental management. This change caused the delay in commencing operations under the component. Performance by the Ecuadorian fund Populorum Progressio (FEPP) and INDA under the land purchase sub-component financed by IFAD is considered "satisfactory".

Performance by NGOs and grass-roots organizations. The evaluation concludes that the performance of STOs and TTOs was "satisfactory" within the parameters set by the project, but it is not clear that it was satisfactory from the point of view of community participation and the transfer of power to the communities. Both the annual external audits and the communities themselves have indicated that much remains to be done in order to achieve transparent, participatory management.

General project evaluation and conclusions

Generally speaking, PRODEPINE is considered a highly replicable and successful project, both because of its relevance within the socio-economic context in Ecuador and because of its effectiveness in setting up an operating structure at the national level. Above all, this was achieved in the midst of a serious economic crisis, social upheaval, and far-reaching institutional change.

PRODEPINE was created to implement state policy through CODENPE (and today, CODAE) to benefit indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples at the national level. Indeed, the implementation of this policy has now set a benchmark for all of Latin America.

Since the project did not establish a baseline, it is difficult to determine the changes in living conditions for the 3 695 communities surveyed; however, it can be said that a decentralized operating structure has been introduced in these communities that translates into participatory planning through the country's STOs and TTOs. Thanks to this structure which brings together both state institutions and indigenous and black civil organizations, operating conditions are today much more favourable and positive for implementing such policy through a second World Bank loan and perhaps a second IFAD loan as well.

Development with identity. PRODEPINE was designed as a development project with identity. For administrative reasons, the same administrative and operating procedures were applied in all three regions of the country, without taking into account that they are culturally, climatically and ethnically different. There is a widespread perception that PRODEPINE was designed for the Sierra, where most of the country's indigenous people live.

Regionalization and differentiated treatment. It is important to adapt processes to the ethno-cultural, climatic and geographical variables that call for a differentiated approach in the three regions: Coast, Sierra and Amazon. This means different per capita allocations in the three regions. Interculturalization is achieved as a result of peoples' development with their own identities – what does this mean?

Monitoring. The national-level information system known as Rikuk Pacha is an efficient reference system that records key information for the administrative monitoring of the project. However, this information is not sufficient to monitor indicators of social processes for poverty reduction, or to measure their results.

Gender. The only component with a gender strategy is the cajas solidarias sub-component which is focused on women, with loans used mainly for productive activities. Participation by women as end users of financial services has been satisfactory, with more than 15 000 women having benefited from the services offered by the cajas solidarias.

Community participation, accountability, and social audits. According to the annual audits of PRODEPINE, a significant impasse occurred over justifications for expenses and accountability by the STOs and TTOs to regional offices, since rigorous accountability is new to these organizations. Nevertheless, marked progress has been observed. Also, social auditing of STOs and TTOs for communities and the empowerment of communities for self-management are still embryonic.

Participation by STOs and TTOs and role of communities. The STOs and TTOs have received significant institutional strengthening to support communities in drawing up local development plans (LDPs). The STOs are the agencies that administer sub-projects. The field evaluation verified that the administrative capacity of STOs has remained with their leadership and has not trickled down to the remaining STOs or to member communities.

Institutional strengthening. This component strengthened 241 STOs and TTOs in the implementation of 212 indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian LDPs, benefiting 1 345 500 indigenous and 93 600 Afro-Ecuadorians, as well as supplying office equipment.

Lack of baselines. The organizational indicators for the project were built gradually during execution of the consulting report by the Heifer Foundation. The project began without first establishing a baseline.

Coverage. Although it is true that those who have benefited most from this first PRODEPINE are the best organized and well established STOs and TTOs in the Sierra region, it is also true that PRODEPINE has promoted the strengthening of STOs and TTOs throughout the country, and has created new organizations that otherwise would not have been formed.

Dependency on PRODEPINE. PRODEPINE has been very well received by its beneficiaries. In some communities visited, it is the only project they have been exposed to with a decentralized, culturally appropriate strategy. The mission would like to raise an alert that this could create a dependency on PRODEPINE. Self-management appears to have remained in second place. The strengthening of STOs and TTOs is a process that calls for long-term monitoring and follow-up by CODENPE.

Land purchase and water rights sub-component. Of the IFAD investment, 3.7% (USD 345 455) was earmarked for land purchases with support from FEPP. Under the land purchase component financed by IFAD, 634 purchases have been made, benefiting eight organizations in the Sierra region. It is expected that upon project completion, support will have been provided for the preparation of 71 management plans, which is a requirement for obtaining property title. There is some question, however, as to whether these plans are actually being implemented. As to the water sub-component, the project supported a study of community irrigation in 793 communities and 40 STOs, and 458 irrigation systems underwent a diagnostic assessment.

Rural financial services sub-component. As of April 2003, the RFS component had disbursed a total of USD 3 166 761, 34.1% of the IFAD investment. Despite the delay in start-up, the RFS sub-component has made major strides in implementation. This evaluation concludes that the sub-component has contributed to expanding the supply of microfinance to low-income sectors among indigenous and, to a lesser extent, black populations. Through the cajas solidarias, a process has been established that stimulates the creation of effective demand for financial services among low-income population groups. The delay in commencing the RFS sub-component was attributable to factors such as the financial crisis at the time of project start-up, communication problems between the project and IFAD, and the sub-component's isolation within the project itself. During the first two years of implementation, the sub-component was not able to come up with an adequate response to address these problems.

Public investment subprojects. This sub-component was financed by IFAD (38%) and by the World Bank (62%). The sub-component financed 661 sub-projects, benefiting 62 644 families in 103 cantons, i.e., 57% more than planned. The sub-projects reached 26% of all indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples. They responded to 33% of requests from grass-roots organizations (1 582 organizations). Afro-Ecuadorians received 16% of the investment for 71 projects, equivalent to USD 1 708 407; and the National Amazonian Federation of Campesino and Indigenous Organizations (FENOCIN) received 13%, equivalent to USD 497 221, for 62 projects. The LDPs focus on generating outputs rather than on cultural revitalization processes or long-term organizational strengthening. They are prepared under a fundamentally economic and organizational approach.

Recommendations

To ensure the successful completion of PRODEPINE with IFAD financing, and in the event of new financing, the evaluation mission recommends the following:

Extension of completion date. Given that USD 9.3 million of the investment was disbursed over four years, and that there is a balance remaining of USD 5.1 million to be disbursed by March 2004 (including one extension), it is recommended that the completion date be extended to March 2005 so that the project may be completed satisfactorily. If IFAD decides to invest in a new project, it is recommended that preparations begin right away to avoid slippage, and that week-long missions take place twice a year.

IFAD presence. It is recommended that IFAD maintain more of a presence in supervision during the execution of the remaining 35% of Loan 464-EC, particularly since the World Bank has completed its PRODEPINE I operation. In the event of a new IFAD operation, it is recommended that a more adequate monitoring and supervision plan be drawn up.

Institutionalization of PRODEPINE as a government programme for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples. Since PRODEPINE is a project that operates under CODENPE-CODAE policy for strengthening indigenous and black people, it is recommended that it become a government programme rather than a project. It is recommended that CODAE be strengthened as well.

Promote regionalized strategies. IFAD has shown an interest in "having differentiated mechanisms for different people, and particularly for Amazon peoples as opposed to highland Andean indigenous campesinos4". The PRODEPINE regional offices have expressed a need to adapt processes to regional realities. The northern Coast region would like to have an African PRODEPINE, the Amazon region an Amazon PRODEPINE.

Long-term institutionalized decentralization. Given the high degree of decentralization of public services in municipalities, the evaluators suggest that the PRODEPINE regional offices be brought closer, operationally speaking, to municipal governments, so that LDPs are not developed for PRODEPINE alone but rather include all critical factors for development (health, water and sanitation, education, etc.) in cooperation with all public and private agencies at the municipal level.

Interculturalization. It is recommended that the indigenous cultural indicators prepared by the Integrated System of Social Indicators for Ecuador (SIISE) be adapted to the System of Social Indicators for Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (SIDENPE), and integrated within the PRODEPINE II monitoring system. "Informed consultation" on the regional elements of "interculturalization" and intercultural adaptation of processes to regions should be promoted.

Continue focusing on critical factors of interculturalization, gender and community participation. Strengthen, within the Rikuk Pacha system, gender and cultural variables differentiated for all three of the country's regions. Ensure that a baseline exists at the outset of the next project.

Monitoring processes and results. Update the Rikuk Pacha system so that it reflects not only administrative processes but also processes and results that have a social impact, and train communities to carry out "participatory monitoring" of changes. Use evaluation methodologies and instruments prepared under the project itself (i.e. the methodologies of RURALINVEST, social capital measurement, LDP preparation, environmental monitoring and assessment, and rural development project evaluation).

Take strengthening to communities (what does this mean?). Under PRODEPINE I, institutional strengthening was targeted to CODENPE-CODAE and to STOs and TTOs, and to a lesser degree to beneficiary communities. It is recommended that communities be trained to: (i) self-manage, design and execute their own projects; and (ii) supervise and control the administration of funds by STOs and TTOs by "generating the budget in a participatory manner", through "participatory monitoring" and "community implementation". STOs and TTOs must be capable of administering funds and rendering accounts, but communities need to have greater influence in order to appropriate the implementation and maintenance of their own projects.

Introduce an annual update system for LDPs for communities. The LDPs are live documents and need to be updated accordingly. Those found date back to 1998. It is recommended that they be updated annually.

Community contracting. Subcontract project administration, training, etc. to NGOs and indigenous associations, in order to provide opportunities for professional development.

Solidify strategic alliances with other programmes both at the state level and with civil society – for example, the Urban Development and Housing Ministry (MIDUVI) - Housing, Water and Sanitation5, the Social Investment Fund of Ecuador (FISE)6, the Intercultural Bilingual Programme of the Ministry of Education (ME), the Department of Indigenous Health of the Public Health Ministry and others – to coordinate efforts directed at the target population.

In the event that further IFAD financing is granted, set up an Inter-Institutional Consultative Committee to design (with economies of scale) and coordinate policies and optimize results. The Committee could comprise: (i) CODENPE and CODAE; (ii) cooperating agencies, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Regional Programme for Strengthening Regional Evaluation Capacity (PREVAL) and the World Bank; (iii) public institutions (Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, Finance, MIDUVI, PRAGUAS); and (iv) grass-roots indigenous organizations.

Land component. Follow-up is recommended for land development plans covering land purchased or legalized through PRODEPINE. At the moment, the implementation of these plans is the responsibility of the communities, with support from STOs. It is imperative that a programme such as PRODEPINE continue to cover demand for legalization and purchase of ancestral territories in all three regions, but most emphatically in the Amazon region where a diagnostic assessment has found 1 294 759 ha of land remaining to be legalized.

Water component. It is recommended that a study of irrigation be carried out, incorporating the needs of 70 STOs and 726 irrigation systems for 1 368 communities, to be financed with other funds under a subsequent phase of PRODEPINE.

RFS component. The mission's main concern with respect to RFS is the lack of consolidation. The sub-component is halfway towards achieving its objectives: "Increasing access by indigenous and black communities to financial resources that will enable them to fund productive activities and facilitate the establishment of efficient and sustainable financial systems for the target population". If the sub-component's activities were terminated at this time, it is possible that indigenous and black populations would lose the opportunity to access rural financial services. Based on the objective of this sub-component, strategic elements are suggested to develop the RFS:

  1. Sector coordination: It is recommended that technical staff from PRODEPINE regional offices play a more active role as facilitators of local processes, coordinating their activities and forging strategic alliances with organizations working in the same sector;

  2. Regional strategy: Given the high degree of heterogeneity of the local environments in which the project operates, it is recommended that three different overall strategies be developed in the context of each region (Coast, Sierra, and Amazon). Necessary steps for each strategy are discussed in detail in Appendix 3:

    1. Link cajas solidarias to LFAs. Facilitate connections: (a) between LFAs and (independent) cajas solidarias so that the former grant loans to the latter and these in turn on-lend to their members; or (b) between cajas solidarias to improve the financial capacity of small cajas.
    2. Assist LFAs in reducing their scale, i.e. include the PRODEPINE target group among their traditional clientele. Instruments for serving the project's target population must be transferred to LFAs.
    3. Professionalize LFAs with financial products directed to the target population. This strategy calls for qualitative changes so that an institution that is already serving the target population may do so in a more efficient, more stable and more professional way.

Credit fund strategy. The current two-tier model is considered adequate, and on this basis several elements are proposed for the second phase. It is suggested that responsibility for the fund be assumed by PRODEPINE II. This option would allow a technical unit to be financed at the national and regional levels, which would in turn allow for continuity in following up on agreements with LFAs and portfolio management. The fund would be administered by PRODEPINE. CODENPE would sit on the fund's board of directors. A credit committee would make final decisions on matters concerning lending policy. Income from the second-tier fund should cover the technical unit's operating and financial expenses, which is currently not the case. The technical unit in the post-project phase should be small (two or three people) with operating costs of not more than 5% of the loan portfolio (in 2002, they were 5.5%). If necessary, the current subsidy (3-4%) to LFAs would be cut and the interest rate raised.


1/ The Mission was composed of Ms. Sra. Ximena Traa-Valarezo, Anthropologist; Mr. Arie Sanders, Specialist in Rural Finance Sector; Mr. Vincent Brackelaire, Sociologist and Ms. Consuelo Rojas, Economist Spezialized in Rural Development. The misión counts on ample experience in evaluation of projects targeted to indegenous peoples. Ms. Katharina Kayser, Evaluation Officer, IFAD, participated during the first week of field work. Project Officials from PRODEPINE, both the Central and the Regional Offices, collaborated with the evaluation team without interfering in meetings, interviews or focus groups meetings in the field.

2/ The PREVAL methodology is an effective instrument for monitoring development processes. However, it has not yet been used at the central or regional levels.

3/ Another two projects implemented by CONDENPE are the Cotopaxi Development Project (PRODECO) financed by the European Union and the Indigenous Alternative Municipalities Strengthening Project (FORMIA) financed by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECI). All three projects (PRODEPINE, PRODECO Y FORMIA) are considered to be executing units of CODENPE.

4/ Comment made by Roberto Haudry de Soucy, IFAD Operations Manager and quoted in "Comments by the Cofinancier" in the project completion report. World Bank, January 21, 2003, Page 18.

5/ Water Project for Small-scale Municipalities and Rural Communities (PRAGUAS) financed by the World Bank.

6/ Rural Sanitation Programme, financed by the Inter-American Development Bank.

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