Republic of Panama: rural development project for Ngöbe-Buglé communities - IOE
Republic of Panama: rural development project for Ngöbe-Buglé communities
The Rural Development Project for Ngöbe-Buglé Communities was launched in March 1994 and will end in December 2001. Its design and execution have yielded lessons that will undoubtedly be of use for the design of a new project for the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, which the Government of Panama has requested from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as for other projects of the Government and of IFAD in similar regions.
A number of activities remain to be carried out in order to consolidate the actions undertaken. These activities will be completed during the current year by the Project Executing Unit (PEU) and the public sector entities involved in the project's execution.
The Rural Development Project for Ngöbe-Buglé Communities was a complex project in that it included an ethnic rights objective-legal recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca-which endowed the project with very special political characteristics stemming from the involvement of indigenous leaders in the Steering Committee and the provision of training to prepare those leaders to carry out planning and administration for the Comarca. As a result of the latter, the project succeeded in forming human capital among the Ngöbe-Buglé population (technicians, leaders, and producers), which will certainly continue yielding results in the future. The project also envisaged activities that posed a significant technical challenge, such as the improvement of family incomes based on agricultural production in an agriculture-ecological environment with restrictions and the establishment of the Capitalization Fund to finance productive activities, which was to be administered by grass-roots beneficiary organizations that lacked an organizational tradition and had weak administrative and managerial capacity.
The project was carried out in a favourable macroeconomic, political, and climatic context, characterized by moderate but sustained growth of the national economy. In addition, monetary and price stability prevailed, thanks to the government's recognition of the unfair distribution of wealth among the Panamanian population and its especially detrimental effect on the indigenous populations, the formulation of social policies targeting the poorest groups, stability of domestic agricultural prices, and the absence of climatic disasters, except for some negative effects of the El Niño phenomenon in 1997.
Conclusions and lessons learned from the experience
The execution of the project yielded several lessons of importance for the Government of Panama and IFAD, which will surely help improve the design and execution of the new project planned for the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca.
Legal recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca: One of the project's most important accomplishments is its contribution to the recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, since the achievement of that legal status will ensure effective protection of the territories of the Ngöbe-Buglé people, establishment of their own forms of government, and maintenance of their way of life and traditions. The most noteworthy activities in this area were the economic and logistic support provided to the Intergovernmental Commission of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice and to the indigenous leadership, the dissemination of laws 10 and 69 and Charter of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, and the logistic and financial support for the various General and Regional Congresses held during the project execution period.
Organization for project execution: During the execution period of the project there were three different elected governments, which led to significant institutional, political, and economic changes. These modifications and the changes in government themselves had repercussions for the project, but it was expected that the participation of representatives of the Ngöbe-Buglé General and Regional Congresses on the Steering Committee would lend a degree of stability to the Executing Unit. However, because the representatives of the Congresses on the Steering Committee also changed frequently, this was not entirely the case. The approval of the Charter of the Comarca, which establishes longer terms of office for the Congresses, will help improve the stability of the new project.
Participation by the beneficiaries: A highly positive aspect of the project was the participation of the beneficiaries in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of activities. Mechanisms for beneficiary participation were built into the design, but new forms of participation were also added as a result of the evolution of the beneficiary organizations. The basic mechanisms for participation were: (i) formulation, monitoring, and evaluation of the annual work plans of the development centres by the producers councils, composed of leaders of grass-roots groups and community organizations; (ii) inclusion of four Ngöbe-Buglé leaders on the Steering Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the project; and (iii) participation of Ngöbe-Buglé representatives on the Regional Credit Committees.
Gender perspective: The project achieved important effects and impacts in the adoption of the gender perspective, which for several of those interviewed signified a positive break with tradition, since Ngöbe-Buglé culture assigns women a secondary position in the social milieu. The evidence of this positive impact can be seen in the participation of women in the beneficiary organizations, their access to leadership positions within those organizations, the appointment of women to key posts within the PEU, and also their participation in important positions in the political-administrative entities of the Comarca. Cross-cutting application of the gender perspective by the technical team of the PEU contributed the achievement of these results.
Community development plans: The project promoted the execution of participatory rural assessments and the formulation of five-year community development plans, which served as a guide for the preparation of annual community plans, which, in turn, formed the basis for the annual work plans for the project. However, these plans were not updated or used as input for the participatory evaluation processes. This detracted from the coherence and long-term vision of the activities, and their contribution to the sustainability of the processes engendered by the project was therefore limited.
Co-executing institutions from the public sector: The overall performance of the project depended more on the performance of the public institutions that collaborated in its execution than on the functional organization of the PEU, and the failure of some of those institutions to fulfil their commitments limited the project's sphere of action. As a result of these failings on the part of the co-executing institutions, many activities were not carried out or were left to the PEU, whose technical staff was overburdened with responsibilities. The Ministry of Agriculture (MIDA), the Agricultural Research Institute of Panama (IDIAP), the National Environmental Authority (ANAM), and the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) lacked the internal organizational capacity and resources to fulfil their commitments to the project, and the PEU was not always in a position to make up for the shortfall in resources. Moreover, the agreements provided only a frame of reference for interinstitutional cooperation. Future agreements should include, at a minimum, the activities to be carried out, the specific goals and expected outcomes (effects and impacts), and also the indicators that will be used to verify the achievement of those outcomes. The agreements should also be revised and adjusted annually.
It also became clear that some public institutions did not have the capacity to provide appropriate services to the indigenous population because they were not knowledgeable about the predominant production systems and they lacked a suitable technological-productive proposal and extension methodologies that took account of the characteristics of the beneficiary population (e.g., language, high level of illiteracy). In the future, it would therefore be desirable to consider employing alternative systems that utilize community members who have received intensive training, who live in the communities, and who are able to communicate in their own language. This means establishing an appropriate training programme and mechanisms for providing refresher courses for the promoters trained.
Stability of the PEU staff: The Government of Panama, IFAD, the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and the co-executing institutions endeavoured to overcome the technical, organization, and functional limitations of the project. However, these efforts were unsuccessful in many cases, owing mainly to the high staff turnover within the PEU. The foregoing difficulties delayed start-up of the project, which was launched in 1994, but it was not until 1997 that all the components finally got under way. It is noteworthy that 1997 was also the year that Ngöbe-Buglé professionals joined the executive management of the PEU. An indicator of this high turnover is that the 8 key positions within the PEU were held by 32 different people, who served for an average of 14 months each, although it should be pointed out that 8 of those 32 people were promoted from lower positions within the PEU. Obviously, the learning period for the new staff meant that the PEU's performance of functions and services did not improve over time to the degree expected.
Administration of the PEU: The organization and implementation of the project management unit was not very well suited-in terms of annual expenditure level-to the administrative activities required. Proof of this was the appreciable delay in the disbursement of funds for IFAD loan 331-PM-so much so that the amount authorized for the Special Account was disbursed in 1995, but only in 1997 was the first replenishment of funds solicited. Despite these problems, however, thanks to timely action by the Social Emergency Fund (FES)/Social Investment Fund (FIS), the entire counterpart contribution was paid on time, which made it possible to maintain project operations when the IFAD loan funds could not be disbursed. The design should specify the administrative and accounting procedures to be used and the staffing needs for the project and should also identify the computer capabilities required to administer several sources of financing.
Social organization: The Rural Development Project for Ngöbe-Buglé Communities was a demand-oriented project, and support for and formalization of existing organizations-before creating new organizations-facilitated organizational strengthening of the population and increase the possibilities for sustainability. As a result of the work in the area of social organization, there are currently 20 community organizations, almost all of them legally established, including 14 cooperatives and 4 producer associations with a total membership of close to 1 000. In addition, this component of the project served 336 grass-roots groups composed of farmers, artisans, environmentalist committees, and pro-works committees, several of these groups were never consolidated and almost 40% later broke up. This organizational achievement is quite noteworthy, given that the Ngöbe-Buglé cultural tradition emphasizes family work, not group work. In addition, support for the producer councils, which emerged as a local initiative, fostered the empowerment of the beneficiaries and provided elements that will help ensure the sustainability of local development processes.
Training: More than 3 300 training events were carried out under all project components. In the case of the training for production development and environmental protection, a "cascade training" approach was applied. However, this approach was not sufficiently accompanied by other activities to assure in-service training for those who would be expected to replicate the knowledge and abilities they have learned in order to ensure the quality of the training received by people at the lowest levels of the "cascade." Moreover, provision was not made for the training of more than one representative or leader per organization, which hinders the continuity of processes when leaders are replaced in the natural course of events.
The training for production development had limited impact because: (i) short-term training with broad coverage was important for disseminating new technologies, but greater relative emphasis should have been placed on more intensive training with fewer participants; (ii) training for technicians and producers, especially the leaders of organizations devoted to the marketing of products, should have incorporated matters relating to markets and marketing; (iii) although it is logical for several components to include training activities, the central role of the training component should have been clearly established with regard to the prioritization of contents, types of beneficiaries to be served, and coordination of the training with the rest of the activities; and (iv) the quality of the training was not controlled as part of the monitoring activities, which hindered in-depth analysis of the activities and their outcomes.
The exception was the Sustainable Agroforestry School programme for training in organic and conservation-oriented agriculture, which included formal courses and in-service training, and was also was intensive, systematic, and sequential. A total of 326 producers participated in the programme between 1998 and 2000, with 210 (64%) graduating as promoters, thus laying the foundation for an extension service in the Comarca.
Production development: The activities for production development included training, supply technical assistance, and technology assessment; Assistance was provided with regard to traditional crops, new productive activities, and complementary activities, targeting groups of women in particular. Some non-agricultural microenterprises were also promoted. These activities resulted in access to technical assistance and training for more than 3 000 indigenous families belonging to 507 producer groups, the majority of whom had never received such services. In addition, many families launched new productive activities that improved the availability of foods for family consumption. These results were encouraging but limited in scope because the MIDA assigned only 10 extension agents, who lacked vehicles and adequate equipment, and the IDIAP researchers had little experience with the prevailing production technologies and conditions among the Ngöbe-Buglé population.
Capitalization Fund: There were serious difficulties in establishing and administering the Capitalization Fund, as a result of which the initial financing was not disbursed until 1997. The amount approved as of 31 December 2000 was 728 000 balboas, distributed among 10 cooperatives, 1 producer association, and 258 grass-roots groups. However, because of the lengthy procedures for authorization and disbursement of the funds, as of that date only 341 000 balboas had been disbursed to 4 cooperatives, 1 producer association, and 124 grass-roots groups, benefiting 1 518 indigenous families. The impact of these loans cannot be established, owing to the short duration of the programme and the fact that the beneficiaries received a single loan. Moreover, the Fund's institutional and financial sustainability is doubtful because the interest rates were not sufficient to cover the costs of administration, currency devaluation, potential default, and capitalization. Furthermore, accounting practices for the project and the community organizations were deficient in that they did not allow for good monitoring of the Fund.
The reasons for these limited results are attributed to the following factors: (i) lack of specialized institutional capacity to administer the fund in accordance with accepted technical standards; (ii) application of a financial policy for the project was difficult because social interests prevailed which were at odds with financial management standards; the role of the project should therefore have been mainly to formulate policies and then contract for administrative services from a specialized financial entity; (ii) as specified in the design, the loans were made in kind in order to control investments by the beneficiaries, but the experience of other projects with regard to this modality of disbursement has not been positive because the borrower's management capacity is underestimated and also because direct responsibility is assumed in the financed activity, which increases the transaction costs (transport, storage, losses, and others; and (iii) no provision was made for a savings component, although experience with microfinance has shown that an intermediation system is not sustainable in the long term without mobilization of the users' own resources; furthermore, those savings may serve as an element for client selection and may be used as collateral.
Physical infrastructure: The results of this component were the construction of 11 development centres-one more than expected; improvement of 83 km of rural roads, and arranging with other institutions for an additional 54 km of road improvement; construction of 7 suspension bridges for use by pedestrians and beasts of burden; improvement of 23 walking paths (93.5 km); and execution of two road studies, one for a road between Cerro Sombrero and Llano Tugrí, future seat of government for the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca. The development centres and suspension bridges were built by private contractors. The community contributed the labour for improvement of the paths, and the MOP collaborated in improving the roads, although subsequently the PEU was obliged to take over the works. Responsibility for maintenance of the bridges, paths, and some lesser works in the development centres and on the roads was assumed by the pro-works committees created under the project. All the works were well executed, with the exception of the road improvements, in which case the technical specifications were not followed and the needed maintenance was not performed. Consequently, the roads deteriorated rapidly (within two years) and will need to be rehabilitated again.
The lessons learned from the execution of the component were that: (i) when co-execution modalities with public institutions are established, the project should have guarantees of the technical capacity and the availability of resources from the co-executing institution; (ii) the commitments of the various parties should be clearly spelled out in the agreements, as should the mechanisms for evaluation, revision, and adjustment; and (iii) the effective participation of the communities, through the pro-works committees, in the selection of the works to be carried out and in their later maintenance contributed significantly to the positive effects achieved.
Environment and forestry development: The principal environmental protection activities were training for technicians and beneficiaries, awarding of fellowships for student leaders from the Comarca, promotion of the formation of several environmentalist groups, three environmental studies, and a latrine-building programme. However, the environmental situation assessments envisaged in the design were not carried out, which made evaluation of the component difficult. The lessons learned were that: (i) lack of information on the environmental situation at the outset limits the ability to assess the effects and impacts of the project and hinders the development of indicators to guide decision-making during project execution; and (ii) the lack of medium- and long-term plans impedes the continuity of activities, especially when there is a change in personnel. This planning, which should be updated periodically, should be the starting point for the annual work plans developed jointly with the beneficiaries and the environmental authority. The Forestry Development component enabled beneficiaries to receive training in reforestation methods and implementation and management of test plots; however, the results (105 ha reforested) were insufficient in terms of the expectations included in the design.
Monitoring and evaluation: The activities carried out in this area focused on annual operational planning, monitoring of annual work plans and monthly work programmes, and evaluation. Training was also provided to enable beneficiaries to participate in these activities. The baseline study, which was to be used for the strategic planning of the project and for its final evaluation, was not contracted for until 1999. However, the work was not completed and the final report is not available. In addition, the design of the monitoring and evaluation system was not prioritized, either. The system was not was developed until late 1997, and it was only partially implemented. Hence, the project did not have a true system of monitoring and evaluation because the evaluation and monitoring activities were not linked; rather, they were carried out in an isolated and not very systematic manner and did not utilize the project objectives and community plans as a basis.
These agreements are aimed at consolidating the project's achievements. Some can be taken on and executed by the project, though others will require the participation of the governmental institutions involved in project execution, whose mandate is to assist in the development of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca.
Monitoring and evaluation: The information available in the project monitoring and evaluation system should continue to be systematized. It is also important apply the methodology used in the baseline survey for the final evaluation, as doing so will yield more consistent and reliable information for determining the effects and impacts of the project. In addition, bearing in mind that a plan for development of the Comarca is being prepared, it is important to link the community development plans and the annual work plan of the project with the plan for the Comarca, which will make it possible, in the final evaluation of the project, to assess not only the degree to which the its objectives were achieved, but also its concrete contribution to the development of the Comarca.
Training: With regard to building local capacity for development, an evaluation of the training system is needed to provide a basis for programming training activities under the new project. That evaluation should analyse the strengths and weakness of the communities and the beneficiary organizations in terms of the achievement of the long-term objectives of the community development plans and the plan for development of the Comarca. In order to reinforce the learning achieved, it is important also establish mechanisms for ensuring in-service training and follow-up with the producer councils and the producers involved.
Production development: In order to assure the sustainability of the effects and impacts achieved and contribute to the creation of a better extension system in the future, the following actions are recommended:
a. Transfer, to the extent possible, equipment, materials, and means of transport to the development centres , which could be managed by the producer councils;
b. Consolidate the productive activities fostered by the project, reinforcing the training on conservationist technologies and marketing processes;
c. Ensure the participation of the promoters trained at the Sustainable Agroforestry Schools in a future IFAD project in the Ngöbe-Buglé area;
d. Promote the modality of volunteer technical assistance used in the JICA programme.
Capitalization Fund: The activities planned under this subcomponent were not completed, and new credit regulations are still being drawn up and preparations are ongoing for the establishment of a second-tier organization of cooperatives to manage the revolving funds. In addition, close to USD 500 000 approved by the Steering Committee and approximately USD 550 000 in available fresh funding remained undisbursed. The mission believes that this second-tier organization is not very feasible in the short term. Moreover, the community organizations have little experience and need to be strengthened with an eye towards their consolidation. It is therefore recommended that a nongovernmental organization with credit experience in the area be retained to manage the funds, which would be accessible to community organizations in the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, both for their own productive activities and for the extension of loans to members or grass-roots groups. It is important that the latter not have direct access to the Fund and that the conditions for sub-loans, including interest rates, be established by the community organizations.
Future use of the road machinery: The machinery was acquired to improve and maintain the roads of the Comarca with the ongoing participation of the MOP. However, this did not fully occur, which led to problems that affected the quality and stability of the works. This situation makes it essential to consider new ways of utilizing and operating the machinery in order to ensure that it remains in the Comarca and is operated efficiently.
Environment and reforestation: The environmental protection and forest development activities should be part of a plan for environmental management of the Comarca. It is therefore recommended that the ANAM develop such a plan, in fulfilment of its mandate. The plan should also identify and appraise the productive activities compatible with rational use of natural resources with a view to restoring and preserving the ecological balance in the Comarca.
Administration: The current accounting records are inadequate to complete the administrative closing of the project. Hence, it is recommended that accounting practices be normalized during 2001 so that the project's assets can be transferred, as appropriate, to beneficiary organizations. This transfer of assets should be based on an updated socio-economic assessment of the applicant organizations.
Budgetary and financial issues: The budget approved for fiscal year 2001 (USD 1 000 000) is clearly insufficient to complete the execution of the project activities under way, which include preparation and updating of the community development plans, implementation of a system for ensuring the sustainability of the Capitalization Fund and transfer of the development centres (equipped and in good repair), in addition to ensuring that the road machinery remains in the Comarca. Accordingly, it is recommended that the FIS and the MEF take the necessary steps to obtain a budgetary increase as soon as possible in order to conclude the activities during 2001. IFAD might also consider modifying the pari-passu for the remaining loan funds.