Completion evaluation

Evaluation approach and core learning partnership

IFAD's Office of Evaluation undertook a completion evaluation of the Special Country Programme – Phase II (PSN-II) in the Niger two years after its closure. The core learning partnership for this evaluation was composed of the parties most concerned with the evaluation conclusions and recommendations. It included the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Niger; the Western and Central Africa Division of IFAD; the Programme Management Division of the World Food Programme (WFP); the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the Office of Evaluation of IFAD.

The evaluation was based on an approach paper in line with the methodological framework defined by IFAD, which was discussed with the members of the core learning partnership, first at IFAD headquarters and then in the Niger during a preparatory mission in July 2006. The main evaluation mission was carried out from 19 September to 17 October 2006 and made use of three complementary sources of information: bibliographical study, interviews with stakeholders, partners, former PSN-II staff members and beneficiaries, and field observations. At the end of the main mission, a discussion meeting was organized with the technical partners of the programme and an aide-memoire was presented to the ministries concerned. The first draft report was discussed with the partners between December 2006 and February 2007, after which the evaluation report was finalized.

A national evaluation wrap-up workshop was held on 17 May 2007 in Niamey, attended by the main PSN-II partners, in order to discuss how the evaluation recommendations were to be implemented and to establish bases for the present agreement at completion point. The agreement recapitulates the main recommendations of the evaluation, taking into account the proposals made by those participating in the wrap-up workshop and accepted by the Government of the Niger, represented by the Minister of Agricultural Development and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and by IFAD's Western and Central Africa Division.

Main findings of the evaluation

The PSN-II was identified in 1992, formulated in the first half of 1994 and appraised in the first half of 1995, and then approved by IFAD's Executive Board in September 1995. The suspension of IFAD's portfolio for the Niger delayed the project launch until 1998, while two breaks in activities meant that it was not completed until December 2004. The project had the general objective of "sustainably re-establishing the conditions for balanced development based on optimal use of all natural resources", and it set up interventions in five of the country's six regions, focusing on issues ranging from irrigated farming (Tillabéri and Diffa) to the management of village land (Illéla, Loga, Ouallam and Diffa) and grasslands (Tchintabaraden, Abalak and Tchirozérine), and rural credit (all regions covered by the project).

Although the objectives of the PSN-II were relevant to the Niger's policies and IFAD's country strategy, the intervention strategy and the anticipated operating resources turned out to be fairly impractical and unrealistic, especially in view of the context and the capacities actually offered by the project set-up. Management and organizational problems, combined with a widely dispersed design in terms of both area and sector, hampered the project's effectiveness and efficiency. Measured against its ambitions and the resources used, the PSN-II had a limited impact. The PSN-II components had only a very limited success in meeting the needs of the poorest inhabitants, especially women and young people, because of the lack of a proper strategic and methodological reflection on the adjustment of poverty reduction approaches, and also of an adequate targeting strategy. The sustainability of the project's benefits also seems on the whole unsatisfactory, because of the absence of a proper strategy to ensure the long-term sustainability of the organizations and services put in place. The project was unable to take advantage of opportunities that arose to transfer its functions and capacities to private or public operators or to enlist sustainable organizations.¹

In irrigated farming zones, the PSN-II had an impact on farm productivity, thanks to agricultural extension and improved access to irrigation water for farmers exploiting collective irrigation schemes. Work to rehabilitate PSN-I schemes was undertaken on two thirds of the irrigated areas planned, but suffered from major delays. Agricultural extension work benefited most farmers, and the adoption rate was 80 per cent for more than half the technical subjects on which extension was provided. However, various shortcomings were noted in that insufficient account was taken of farmers' broader production systems, market access and security of land tenure, particularly in the case of women. Although the exploitation rate for irrigation schemes certainly increased thanks to the project, there has thus been a steady abandonment of them since it ended. The promotion of producers' organizations reached more groups than anticipated, but efforts to boost collective capacities for infrastructure management, upkeep and renewal were limited. The small-scale agricultural research carried out in partnership with the National Agricultural Research Institute bore some interesting fruit, but there was a failure to capitalize on these or disseminate the results

With regard to land management (gestion des terroirs), the teams made major efforts to design an approach that would allow local inhabitants to draw up a medium-term land development and management plan and establish an organization capable of implementing it. Delays in getting the project off the ground and then the various suspensions of IFAD's Niger portfolio during this period of political instability meant that only one third of the anticipated land management and development plans could be prepared and less than half of these could be implemented. Soil and water conservation and soil protection and restoration (SWC-SPR) initiatives based on simple techniques suited to farmers' capacities saw a major expansion. The installation of tassa planting pits and stone lines increased crop yields by as much as 30 per cent in some places, thus helping to increase the cereal availability of households with land. There has since been an expansion of such rehabilitation work on the initiative of the local inhabitants. The interventions of the PSN-II with regard to environmental protection were based on new approaches, notably in terms of assisted natural regeneration (ANR), contributing to increased biodiversity and reforestation of the Niger's Sahelian belt. ² Despite this, the anticipated impacts on management systems for common resources remained slight over all. The installation of local infrastructures was below projections. Cereal bank initiatives generally had little effect on the food security level of the poorest households. In grassland zones, SWC-SPR initiatives involved the local population in the work, and collaboration with WFP and the food-for-work approach led to a greater involvement of those concerned. Social bonds were strengthened thanks to the discussions and exchanges organized under the project. The PSN-II did not allow formal acknowledgement of land development committees, but it is expected that the rural communes set up in 2004 should take over these responsibilities

With regard to the component that focused on strengthening rural finance systems, in general terms credit operators' capacities were not boosted sufficiently to allow them to continue credit activities among the resource-poor rural inhabitants of the intervention zones after their operating contracts ended. Three credit mechanisms were put in place, with objectives, principles and operators that varied according to zone. The modus operandi adopted in partnerships with credit operators generally suffered from the various cash-flow breaks under the PSN-II and from a lack of communication and flexibility. The second mechanism, which granted loans through a local savings and credit union in the Diffa zone, was the only one that enabled distribution of a fairly large volume of loans, mainly short-term, with an excellent recovery rate. In grassland zones, a change in women's behaviour was noted, fostering their emancipation, thanks to the creation of savings and credit funds. In these areas, microcredit benefits were for the most part reinvested in food for the household.

Recommendations approved by the government and IFAD

Recommendation 1

Rural development projects should be better targeted in terms of area and sector, basing such choices on the capitalized experience of other interventions and a clear understanding of socio-political issues and the causes of poverty/vulnerability. In concrete terms, this means that:

• In a difficult socio-political context such as that in the Niger, with limited local capacities, it seems vital to set up projects that are (i) geographically better focused, (ii) flexible and evolutive so that interventions can progressively increase in scope and volume as experience is gained, and (iii) confined more narrowly to sectors judged priorities for rural development and the reduction of poverty and inequalities. Such a strategy should encourage the growth of a real development dynamic, which will then be boosted by strong complementarities and synergies to be established with other projects and donors.
• A good grasp of social and economic dynamics and of processes aggravating vulnerability and inequality in the intended intervention areas is an indispensable prerequisite for any intervention. With a view to increasing knowledge about the mechanisms involved in the insecurity of the very poor, a specific working document on this subject will in future be included among project formulation documents. Projects should encourage innovations in targeting methods and impact monitoring based on a participatory identification of poor and vulnerable groups within communities, and these innovations should then be evaluated and disseminated by the Government, so that a proper operational strategy can be designed that is focused on increasing the security of well-defined target groups.
• All projects should incorporate an operational strategy to capitalize on experience. They could contribute particularly to boosting the Ministry of Agricultural Development's documentation centres in order to facilitate the sharing of experience and help in programme formulation.

Recommendation 2

In the present context of decentralization, the faire-faire (outsourcing) concept should move³ from the supply of services to projects towards a real transfer of responsibility concerning local investment works ownership to decentralised government structures and farmers' organizations. Two categories of service providers, preferably local, should be supported: the first category to carry out local investment works and the second category to assist the investment owners with planning and managing local development. The faire-faire approach would thus allow not only to put to good value and develop service providers' capacities, but also to empower decentralized and devolved government structures and farmers' organizations, and to boost their capacities. However, a number of conditions have to be met if this evolution in approach is to bear fruit. In practical terms, the Government and IFAD should make provisions for the following elements when designing projects:

• Support and advice mechanisms for the assumption of decentralized responsibility by regions, communes and farmers' organizations, so that they can negotiate, manage and oversee contracts with providers, preferably local, including precise terms of reference and verifiable, consensual result indicators;
• Supervision of the establishment of services, particularly municipal ones as anticipated in the documents, allowing a proper sustainable exercise of their responsibility with major involvement of beneficiaries;
• Measures and resources to boost local providers' technical and management capacities, together with much greater assumption of responsibility by providers in carrying out services;
• Appropriate financial procedures, guaranteeing the availability of the necessary resources to local operators as and when needed, while allowing a progressive release of funds to service providers on the basis of the results achieved.

Recommendation 3

In difficult institutional circumstances, with limited budgetary and staff capacities, the capacities of those executing projects need to be boosted, and project monitoring and supervision strengthened. To these ends:

• When designing projects, IFAD and the Government should make provisions for good quality technical assistance in order to boost project staff's coordination, methodological and technical capacities. Technical assistance should be designed and evaluated as a programme for the progressive transfer of capacities to project staff.
• Projects should systematically make provisions for a budget to allow regular participation of the lead ministry in all field supervision missions. The lead ministry, which is responsible for ensuring that the recommendations of such supervision missions are implemented, should appoint a permanent officer as the focal point of the project. This officer, in charge of keeping track of the project files, would oversee implementation of the recommendations of supervision missions. An increased IFAD presence in the country should also help to boost operational supervision of projects, allow mediation among the partners when necessary, and promote capitalization on benefits and achievements both within and outside projects.

Recommendation 4

Three major challenges must be met in order to further develop irrigated farming, which is appropriate in the Niger around the country's surface water resources, namely:

• Market access. Inasmuch as the intensification of irrigated farming leads to major costs for farmers (fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, repairs to infrastructure etc.), it is a viable proposition only to the extent that there are opportunities for market disposal of produce at remunerative prices and that these opportunities can be exploited by those farming under an irrigated system, with or without specific support and advice from government technical services or projects.
• Security of land tenure for farmers. Before making hydro-agricultural investments, long-term security of land tenure must always be guaranteed, through supervision of a negotiation and formalization process for long-term tenure agreements. The Government should consider the registration of land ownership with land commissions as a priority, which would then allow the establishment of a formal tenant farming system. When designing projects, IFAD should make provisions for prior studies and technical support with regard to security of land tenure in order to facilitate the achievement of these objectives.
• Incorporation of the development of irrigated farming into a broader local planning and management scheme for natural resources. The development models adopted for irrigated farming must be based on a process of analysis and local planning, taking into account all the production systems found in the village, and in coordination with formal land development schemes.

Recommendation 5

The development of grassland zones is a key element for the country's future and unity, and two central thrusts must be pursued in this connection:

• Improvement in the governance of grassland resources. This is a key factor for more sustainable management of natural resources, but also for the prevention of conflict. Initiatives to bring users and local actors together (Land tenure committees, communes, traditional authorities, herders' and farmers' organizations, local government) must be promoted by the Government of the Niger and IFAD. Such consultations among stakeholders should lead to a definition of generally accepted, appropriate rules in connection with the formal land development schemes. This type of consultative development and management approach has its place in such widely varying contexts as grassland, agro-pastoral and farming zones, inasmuch as herders make use of these various zones at different seasons.
• Crisis prevention strategies for herders. With a view to reducing the effects of recurrent droughts and facilitating the reconstitution of household financial assets, the Government and livestock development projects should help herders to draw up strategies for the security of their herds (security of mobility, advance marketing to prevent crises, individual cereal storage, livestock feed stores for small-scale herders, support to innovation by herders with regard to restocking the herds of the poorest at the end of crises, etc.).

Recommendation 6

Execution of the credit components of projects must be based on existing microfinance institutions and requires a specific capacity-building strategy that goes well beyond a simple partnership for execution.

• Projects must support the sustainable rural financial services approach within which specialized operators and beneficiaries work. The implementation of a "credit" component as part of projects cannot be seen simply as a tool allowing rapid, ad hoc support of cost-effective economic initiatives, parallel with grants for investments.
• Particular stress must be laid on boosting the institutional and organizational capacities of specialized operators so that they are able to continue activities after the end of the project.

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1/It should be noted that decentralization was not started effectively in the Niger until 2004. The transfer of responsibility for local development to communes could thus not yet be anticipated during the project.

2/ The return of shrubs and trees in the Sahel since the mid-1980s has been observed on the basis both of diachronic analysis of aerial or satellite photographs (studies by Chris Reij) and also of various surveys and studies carried out particularly by Louvain-La-Neuve and Amsterdam Universities.

3/ According to the Government and IFAD, recommendation 3 of the evaluation report is focused on too narrow a concept of do-do (having service providers carry out certain project functions). In the context of decentralization, the evaluation's core learning partnership hoped to broaden the concept of do-do to a real transfer of responsibilities to local stakeholders.