Rural Finance and Community Initiatives Project (2005) - IOE
Rural Finance and Community Initiatives Project (2005)
Interim evaluation report 1
Introduction
The Interim Evaluation of the RFCIP is being conducted prior to the consideration of a second phase of the project. The evaluation mission visited The Gambia from 11 July to 7 August 2004. Methodologies utilised included field-level questionnaires, focus group discussions, interviews with key informants and case studies of the various community-based organisations and their members. For impact assessment, the mission relied on a quantitative survey and PRA exercise, carried out for the purposes of the mission by the University of The Gambia, as well as on official documents and socio-economic literature. The evaluation adopts the IFAD framework and provides ratings.2
IFAD has funded or co-funded six projects in The Gambia since 1982, of which two are ongoing: the RFCIP and the Lowlands Agricultural Development Project (LADEP). The latest Country Strategy Opportunities Paper (2003) introduced a lending envelope of US$ 15 million up to 2010 for the development of rice cultivation and the continuation of microfinance initiatives. Rural micro-finance was described as ‘possibly the most important issue for IFAD in The Gambia'. According to national statistics, the ratio of rural credit to rural GDP declined from 30-40% in the early 1980s to only 7-8% in the following decade.
The microfinance sector has demonstrated a growing professionalism in the provision of financial services in rural areas during the last decade, with government policy benefiting from the lessons that sustainability depends on mobilising savings, and avoiding subsidised donor-led credit programmes and ceilings on interest rates. Chief among autonomous microfinance institutions are the Village Savings and Credit Associations (VISACAs), which were established in 1989 and have been consistently supported by IFAD. The two other approaches are credit unions, which tend to flourish in more urbanised areas, and the group lending approach promoted by The Gambia Women's Finance Association (GAWFA), targeting poor women.
The agricultural sector suffered from the cessation of government subsidies during the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) of 1985, and also from the fall in the market price of groundnuts, the main cash crop. Current government policies aim at the revitalization of agriculture through a strategy of public and private sector partnership, with the private sector expected to assume a leading entrepreneurial role. There is special emphasis on improving food security by increasing and diversifying cereal production, and creating rural employment to help reduce disparities between rural and urban incomes.
The RFCIP was approved in December 1998, declared effective in July 1999 and scheduled for closure in December 2005. The project appraisal estimated the total project costs at USD 10.6 million, to be funded by IFAD (USD 9.2 m), the Government of The Gambia (USD 1.0 m) and the beneficiaries (USD 0.4 m in labour contribution). IFAD was the only funding donor and also responsible for project supervision. The goal of the project was the improvement of household food security and incomes in rural areas through the development of agricultural production activities and increased access to rural microfinance services, with strengthened traditional organisations (kafos) participating in the planning and implementation.
The main activities of the project under the Rural Finance component were to be the building or renovation of VISACA premises, the provision of a re-financing facility by financial NGOs, training and technical assistance at all levels and the creation of a VISACA Support Centre. Contribution of grant-equity to village community projects through the Farmer Partnership Fund (FPF) accounted for 24% of baseline costs. Agricultural support comprised participatory research, technology transfer, livestock vaccination and the building of storage facilities. Capacity building for the kafos aimed at enhancing the operation of VISACAs and promoting income-generation. Support for the growth of the VISACA movement was thus to be allied to the promotion of viable investments for farmers. This twinning of microfinance with agricultural support and capacity building constituted the basic rationale for the original project design. The heartland of the project was to be two divisions, the Lower River Division (LRD) and the Central River Division (CRD), where microfinance and agricultural activities were to be implemented side-by-side. The expansion of the VISACAs, on the other hand, was to take place in all divisions. No ‘vertical' targeting was proposed, a certain homogeneity within villages being assumed. On the basis of an eventual total of 80 VISACAs, the number of beneficiaries of the RF component was estimated at 100,000 ‘clients', including 45% women. For the kafo capacity building component, it was envisaged that 300 kafos would be involved, or around 30,000 men and women.
The Department of State for Agriculture (DOSA) was the chief implementing agency. A Project Support Unit (PSU) was set up within DOSA to handle day-to-day coordination and management of activities. Contracted NGOs were responsible for the support and training of VISACAs. The VISACA Promotion Centre (VPC) was responsible for one network as well as acting as the coordinating body. A strengthened Rural Finance Unit within the Central Bank carried out the monitoring and regulatory role. The field-level implementation of the agricultural components was carried out mainly by the Department for Agricultural Services (DAS) and the Department for Livestock Services (DLS) supervised by PSU field coordinators in each division.
Changes in policy and institutions during implementation. A Microfinance Department (MFD) was created within the Central Bank, a recognition of the key role of the microfinance sector in the country and directly linked with the expansion of the VISACA network. The physical targets in the RFCIP Rural Finance component were substantially cut by the 2002 Mid Term Review. The VPC was replaced by a new backstopping institution, the Microfinance Promotion Centre (MFPC) and the Farmer Partnership Fund (FPF) was moved to the Kafo Capacity Building component. Within the Project Support Unit, the post of M&E officer was replaced by that of Agricultural Development Officer after the resignation of the former. The stipulated positions of assistant and analyst for the Rural Finance component were never filled.3
Summary implementation results
There are now 62 VISACAs countrywide. Total membership has almost reached the target of 35,000. Savings stand at GMD 27 millions and loans at GMD 14.7 millions. Net profit (subsidies not netted out) increased rapidly during 2003 as a result of a 127% increase in interest income. However, little has been achieved in terms of the level of portfolio at risk and the capacities of committee members and cashiers. The level of capital is still low, with over 80% of equity consisting of project-funded buildings (donated equity). VISACAs increasingly seek external lines of credit since the interest rate on external lines of credit is 16%, compared with interest on term deposits of up to 25%.
VISACAs have gradually departed from the original concept of village-based institutions owned and run by the community they serve. Some now cover more than 20 villages at a distance of up to 17 km from the founding village. This has resulted in a rise in defaults and impractically large management committees because of the need for all villages to be represented. VISACAs increasingly insist on physical guarantees as a loan condition, preventing the poorest from accessing credit and reducing the focus on savings.
Support to farmers included the vaccination of around 40,000 sheep and goats and nearly 8,000 poultry and the beginnings of a programme of poultry development. Six intensive feed gardens were established to provide feed for lactating and sick animals but few farmers adopted the practice. Support for crop development comprised the establishment of 34 multipurpose gardens, the distribution of cuttings of sweet potato and cassava, improvements to marketing facilities, and training programmes for farmers in integrated pest management, soil fertility management for upland crops and the processing of cassava.
Two innovations were introduced in the agricultural sector: (i) the recruitment and training of 193 Village Auxiliaries for service as volunteer extension workers in their own communities; (ii) the introduction of a voucher-based system for the remuneration of extension officials by which their performance is monitored by village and kafo heads. RFCIP also funded an upland conservation and gully rehabilitation programme for areas affected by severe gully erosion.
The balance of the PSU changed as a result of the replacement of a dedicated M&E officer4 by an agricultural development officer and moving the FPF away from the rural finance component (as recommended by the 2001 IFAD Implementation Support Mission). The composition of the PSU is now slightly skewed against the Rural Finance component, which was to be responsible for 58% of the baseline costs of the project. Neither of the two incumbents of the post of Project Coordinator had a background in micro-finance (reportedly due to the lack of candidates with such qualification).5
Monitoring and Evaluation. International technical assistance was provided to set up the M&E system, and additional backstopping was made available. Despite these provisions, the M&E component did not achieve its primary objective: the collection and analysis of the information necessary to enable decision-makers to diagnose and resolve problems. The Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation implemented since December 2003 is far from being fully operational.
Were the objectives relevant? The three-pronged approach indicated by IFAD's 1997 COSOP–the provision of micro-credit, the diversification of crops and incomes, and the promotion of investments for farmers – constitutes a sensible response to the major problems faced by rural communities in The Gambia, and the kafos (predominantly women's kafos) were rightly seen as an appropriate entry point for project activities.
The VISACA component operated countrywide and the other components only in two divisions. Out of some 130 project sites, almost half are VISACA-only interventions and about half agricultural-only, with a mere half-dozen having both financial and non-financial activities. Since CRD, with the largest number of existing VISACAs, was excluded as a location for new ones, the main geographical focus of the agricultural components had no link with the siting of new VISACAs. The targeting of agricultural activities resulted in a more or less random coverage, often in villages where no VISACA existed. The ‘cluster' targeting envisaged at design was neglected, the synergy essential to the proper working of the project was lacking and the impact correspondingly weak.
The IE survey shows that the RFCIP failed to target the poorest households and kafos, estimating average incomes of RFCIP households in 2000 as almost double those of non-participating households. The selection of locations for new VISACAs on the basis of a certain level of economic potential and dynamism was desirable from the point of view of sustainability but also likely to exclude the poorest communities. This was exacerbated by the VISACAs' growing insistence on physical collateral as a condition for accessing loans.
Lengthy PRA and serious manpower shortage in the extension services. A large number of detailed appraisals were carried out to ascertain whether villages/kafos met the targeting criteria in terms of development levels and whether the request for project intervention reflected the needs and priorities of the communities. The appraisals involved a lengthy field work and large teams but the end result was a painstaking document of around 30 pages, much of it unutilised. There is a manpower shortage in the extension services resulting from the cut-backs during the Economic Recovery Programme and the leakage of staff to the private sector due to the lack of incentives and motivation within DOSA. The 2002 Department of Planning survey shows that 65% of villages were visited by agricultural extensionists less than once a month, and the IE survey of July 2004 found that the quality of the services received only a moderate rating from farmers.
The Farmer Partnership Fund with its cumbersome proposal and authorisation procedures now accounts for the lion's share of RFCIP time, money and effort. The concept of credit-funded community initiatives managed by the Rural Finance component has been replaced by that of grant funding managed by the Field Coordinators and the Project Coordinator. The previous ceiling of $6,000 imposed on the mini-projects has been lifted. The FPF has become a development fund awarded to whichever communities can come up with a well-argued proposal meeting the eligibility criteria.
Lack of measurable impact. The Appraisal ERR estimate of 23% was based on exaggerated incremental effects on upland crop expansion and net income. There is no evidence for increases of the order envisaged and the IE survey reveals a notable lack of impact in areas where it might have been expected. An approximate figure for cost per beneficiary is USD 80 and on this basis RFCIP was not a costly project. The problem is that many of the activities constituted one-off interventions in widely scattered communities, with scarcely discernible impact on incomes.
The operating self-sufficiency of VISACAs was only 65% if subsidization is taken into account, a very low level considering that many VISACAs have been operating for a number of years. There has been too much emphasis on the physical structure and appearance of buildings: the average cost of a new building is around USD 10,000 at current rates. It appears that the requirement for local labour is often ignored, which reinforces the sense that the new buildings are government gifts.
Consultancies replacing M&E. The gradual demise of the M&E system meant that impact assessment and diagnostic studies which ought to have been carried out as part of the routine responsibilities of project M&E were contracted out as ad hoc consultancies. The cost of a consultancy on cereal banks was USD 7,400 and the findings were such as a functioning M&E system would have discovered without outside assistance.
VISACAs have provided access to financial services, putting an end to their members' dependence on shopkeepers and moneylenders. VISACAs were easily the primary source of loans for survey respondents – 61% compared to 5% for commercial banks. Savings among VISACA households have risen by 66% in three years, but two-thirds of savings are kept in formal banks, indicating that VISACAs are perceived as better for credit than for savings. The assets of VISACA households' enterprises have risen between 2000 and 2003 contrasted with a fall for non-VISACA households. This seems to indicate that VISACA households have been able to ‘protect' their enterprise assets by accessing loans when necessary.
Limited effect on income levels. A substantially higher increase in nominal average incomes for non-VISACA clients constitutes one of the most disappointing findings of the IE survey, suggesting that participation in the project did not entail percentage income increases. Data from the 2002 internal evaluation conducted by the Department of Planning of DOSA and anecdotal evidence suggest that significant income increases existed only in those (few) areas where VISACA and agricultural interventions were combined but such increases were much lower when a representative sample of all households and intervention types was considered.
Positive effects on school enrolment and food security. A number of women kafo members reported that they were now able to pay school fees with the income from their gardens. The IE Survey indicated that VISACA loans were utilised by nearly one-third of respondents for the payment of school fees. Five out of the seven project villages covered by the IE PRA exercises said that food security had improved because of the use of loans to buy foodstuffs or through increased rice production made possible by loans, or through consumption of produce from the new vegetable gardens. The building of cereal banks has reduced crop wastage and provided protection for stored grains against rodents and birds. The revival of findo6 cultivation from its near demise has also been an important initiative given the resilience of the plant.
Environmental issues. The problem of soil erosion and local flooding has been tackled at a number of sites through the construction of bunds and Irish crossings. At the sites visited by the mission, the bunds are far too low and the whole system (which involved several kilometres of digging) will need refashioning within a few years. Grasses have been allowed to grow in the channels. The villagers appear to have no real sense of ownership of the schemes. The improper use of synthetic pesticides has been addressed by the project using an Integrated Pest Management approach, which involved the training of kafo members in the preparation and the use of botanical insecticides such as neem and papaya. Farmers can now prepare their own formulations and apply them in the field at little or no cost.
VISACAs as Institutions
VISACA financial products. With the same interest rate applied to all term deposits, there are no incentives to members to save for longer periods, and the average amount of outstanding term deposits is substantially lower than the average amount of outstanding loans. Only access to lines of credit has enabled most VISACAs to manage their liquidity ratio, and some still have ratios well below the minimum 15% required by the Central Bank. VISACAs offer short-term loans for productive and ‘non-productive' purposes. The average loan duration in 2003 was five months. Despite the need for longer-term loans for investments, VISACAs can not offer medium term loans to their members. This is due to the short-term nature of the deposit structure and to the VISACAs' inability to manage a medium term loan product.
External credit and deteriorating quality of loan portfolio. The lower interest rates charged on lines of credit (15 to 18%), contrasted with the high interest rates on deposits (up to 25%), cause many VISACAs to seek external loans and this trend may intensify, thus increasing their dependency on external ‘cold money'. Most VISACAs, especially those with insufficient deposits, would not survive a cessation of the external credit supply. Although the recovery rate to NBFIs is said to be around 95%, the trend is downward. Some NBFIs are considering withdrawing from the programme because of high recovery costs. Interest charged on loans is mostly between 30 and 36%. The question is whether the current real interest rate applied by VISACAs will be sustainable when project subsidies cease. At the end of 2003, 11% of all loans were doubtful, up from 3% in 2001. The increasing amount of default loans over the years is eroding the sustainability of many VISACAs. Faulty loan application appraisal, extended area coverage without adequate means for loan recovery and favoritism in loan allocation are held responsible.
Weaknesses of VISACA governance and lack of incentives at all levels. (i) In VISACAs serving many villages, some villages may not represented on the committee; (ii) there is very little turnover of members; (iii) women are represented in most cases but rarely participate fully; (iv) regulations regarding the functioning of the VISACAs are either lacking, incomplete or unclear; (v) there is an over-reliance on the NGO animators, who keep the books and are responsible for savings mobilization and loan recovery; (vi) the much needed adult literacy courses have not been provided. VISACA members receive no dividend; cashiers and committee members receive a small amount of money only if their VISACA shows a profit at the end of the year, which is often not the case. Recruitment of well trained cashiers is therefore problematic.
Impact of the RFCIP on the microfinance sector. Due largely to the expansion of the VISACA network, the Rural Finance Unit of the Central Bank was promoted into a fully-fledged Microfinance Department. The Central Bank has set up a regulatory framework for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including VISACAs, although the rating system tends to emphasize the number of movements and size of membership rather than financial performance, penalizing smaller VISACAs. The Microfinance Promotion Centre started operations in March 2003 as a national technical service provider, with significant support from the project. It is seriously under-staffed given its proposed role as a technical service provider for the whole microfinance sector.
Gender impact. Women account for 40% of VISACA membership and 60% of deposits, but only 27% of the loans disbursed in 2003 due to their inability to provide physical guarantees for loans. The representation of women on management committees is adequate, with some VISACAs insisting on gender parity. However, nearly all the women are illiterate and generally leave the men to lead the discussion and take the decisions. Around two-thirds of kafo members assisted by the project are women and the most dynamic of the vegetable gardens visited by the mission were run by women. The decision to disqualify milling machines from the menu of FPF is contentious in view of IFAD's strong commitment to reducing the workload of women. Women constitute around 20% of VAs and should perhaps be preferred since married women are unlikely to move away from their villages.
Sustainability
Only VISACAs with good credit discipline and strong leadership are likely to be sustainable. With an average 65% operational self-sufficiency for the whole network, most VISACAs are unsustainable even in the short-term. The reasons for this can be summarised as follows: the high level of portfolio at risk; the low level of savings and loans portfolio; the lack of diversified business opportunities within the area of coverage; insufficient profit to cover the interest payable and operating expenses; the failure of NGOs to deliver the necessary transfer of skills and knowledge. No exit strategy was planned in the early stages of implementation, and none has been included in NGO work plans. VISACAs are still not asked to contribute to operating expenses such as training and animators' fees. The process of institutionalisation has been promoted by RFCIP and NGOs, but the setting up of network apex bodies is in its early stages.
Urgent need for incentives in extension services. The extension service is subject to an acute shortage of manpower and the VAs are no replacement for highly trained extension officers. The only sustainable approach is to put in place attractive packages for extension staff, including regular training programmes, local and overseas study tours, part-time or short-term university courses, instruction in IT, improved office amenities such as reliable telephone connections and power supply, and performance-related bonuses. The supply of vaccines at a subsidized rate needs to be reconsidered after project closure and there will need to be a revision of current fee scales.
Innovation
Outreach of VISACAs. The real innovation of VISACAs would have been to reach the poorest members of the communities they serve by developing financial products adapted to their needs, but there is no evidence for this. An "innovative" aspect of the VISACAs has been their ability to achieve a wide area coverage with a low level of implementation. Even this innovation has not been entirely positive because of the problems (loan recovery) involved in serving a number of scattered villages.
Village auxiliaries and the voucher system. The recruitment and training of volunteer extensionists represents an important innovation and the ‘auxiliary' system could be cheaply replicated throughout the country. Apart from cost, the advantages are obvious: the VAs live and work in the village in question, they speak the same language, share the same problems and are readily available for consultation. Material incentives for VAs will be required if the system is to be a permanent feature of rural life. The voucher-based system introduced to guarantee the work of extension is also an innovation in The Gambia. It minimises false claims by extension workers, encourages the coverage of remote areas and involves beneficiaries in the evaluation of the services. However, the system may serve as a disincentive for energetic officers due to the limit imposed on night-stay claims. The overall project impact was rated as modest (see main report and Appendix III).
IFAD: shortcomings of design. (i) The desired synergy between the three project components was a non-starter because of faulty targeting mechanisms; (ii) only the VISACA approach to rural finance was considered (in spite of the existing alternatives) – this meant the exclusion of the group lending approach; (iii) there was little emphasis on innovative microfinance products for the poor and the issue of medium-term loans for investment was not given sufficient consideration; (iv) no thorough evaluation of potential NGO partners was prescribed; (v) the purpose of the FPF was not adequately clarified; (vi) estimated incremental outputs and beneficiary numbers were much exaggerated.
Direct supervision. The high turnover of IFAD CPMs during the implementation period entailed a lack of continuity. Only the last two of nine missions included a microfinance expert. The problems and constraints clearly signaled at various points do not appear to have been actively pursued. It took nearly three years to replace the under-performing VPC7 and there was a volte-face regarding the structure and function of M&E, never adequately explained. The basic lack of synergy between the components was never analysed and the effects of the transformation of the FPF were missed. As for loan administration: delays in processing withdrawal applications have this year risen to 35-40 days.
The Microfinance department of the central bank has been carrying out regular supervision of the VISACA networks to ensure compliance with Central Bank rules and guidelines and other prudential ratios. Present capacities are insufficient, training levels are inadequate and the supervision schedule too tight. What will happen after the project is phased out? The Microfinance Promotion Centre has also been very active with on-site visits and quarterly reports, but it too is over-stretched.
Department of State for Agriculture. In its present state, with insufficient budgets and staffing levels, which tends to affect staff motivation, it is unsurprising that DOSA has tended to treat RFCIP as an unfocused source of funding.8 The energies of the field coordinators and animation teams have been increasingly taken up in the processing and implementation of FPF mini-projects.
The NGOs. NGO facilitators provided the backstopping for the VISACAs in return for financial support. There was no initial evaluation of the capacities of NGOs mostly concerned with grant administration in various fields. The majority of animators had no background in microfinance and some were unable to follow the basic training provided. Their functions are mostly confined to data collection and on-site book-keeping instruction, and they have been unable to provide training in planning, governance or loan appraisal. RFCIP contracts do not link the remuneration with performance; the contracts are renewable annually, but never has a contract failed to be renewed. Even in the oldest VISACAs the lack of capacity makes them dependent on animators, implying that the necessary transfer of knowledge has not taken place.
The Kafos. The prescribed training and promotional programmes have been duly carried out. However, links with the microfinance activities were tenuous. Initially, it seems that the Kafo Capacity Building component was subsumed within the Agricultural Support programme. Latterly, it has disappeared within the FPF, which accounts for the entire sum set aside for the component in the 2004 budget.
Conclusions and recommendations
The objective of nationwide coverage by VISACAs within six years was unrealistic, and this single design feature concealed a host of problems. The envisaged linkage of components was scarcely attempted and its significance was missed by the PSU and by the Supervision Missions. The ill-conceived shift in the composition of the PSU, the failure to appoint a Project Coordinator with experience of microfinance (reportedly due to the absence of candidates with such background) and to recognise the key role of M&E, together with the predominance of FPF activities in the last years of the project, may also be traced to this initial misconception.
The key Rural Finance component accounted for 57.9% of the budget at appraisal, and 36.6% after the move of the FPF. In the 2004 budget, it accounts for a mere 4.6% of the total. Yet the various reports, including this one, still treat the VISACAs as the heart of the project. The Rural Finance component has in effect been progressively marginalised. The weaknesses of the VISACAs were identified by the IFAD Implementation Support Mission in 2001, but the decisive measures necessary to resolve them were not taken. The Central Bank criteria continued to encourage VISACAs to expand rather than to retrench. Contracts with NGOs were not rewritten so as to insist on a timed exit strategy, nor were payments made conditional on performance. The MTR rightly revised the physical targets but stopped short of demanding other radical solutions.
Some agricultural activities funded by the project, such as the support for poultry farming, vegetable gardens, cassava multiplication and findo cultivation, match the available resources and comparative advantages of farming in The Gambia, but little effort has been made to address the crucial problems of processing and marketing. Simple and inexpensive processing techniques, for example for the preparation of sauces and juices, were not propagated and the need for up-to-date marketing information was neglected. DOSA field staff with relevant expertise are in short supply.
This report emphasises that the RFCIP failed to reach the poorest segments of the rural population but also admits that sustainability of village-level financial institutions requires a certain level of economic potential and capacity to save. This poses a conundrum for IFAD, with its specific brief to target the poorest of the poor. The assumption of the Appraisal Report that no ‘vertical' targeting was necessary was true only for the more remote villages and hamlets. The overall project was rated as modest.
Future IFAD investment in The Gambia requires a radical rethink. A programme of Rural Finance sectoral support, including group-lending strategies, might be more effective than direct support for VISACAs only. The VISACA ‘brand' has been established as the unique village-level financial institution in rural areas of The Gambia, but VISACAs are becoming area- rather than village-based institutions and their modus operandi is mostly based on physical guarantee rather than the amount of deposit or peer pressure. They should put more emphasis on savings mobilization and quality of loan portfolio, and there is a pressing need for greater capacity, particularly in terms of basic literacy.
Rural finance initiatives might still be successfully twinned with support for the agricultural sector provided that a more than a nominal synergy between the two components existed. Agricultural activities should include the expansion of the Village Auxiliary network and the provision of training in vegetable processing, drying, storage, crop planning and marketing.
The Farmer Partnership Fund. The PSU and the PSC should at once reconsider the budgeting and authorisation process for the FPF, which currently take up a disproportionate amount of resources. The ultimate responsibility for the FPF needs to be clarified and decisions made about its objectives. Options should be simplified, appraisals drastically abbreviated and the USD 6,000 ceiling restored.
Relocation of the management unit. In any future microfinance/agricultural project, the project management unit should be established outside the capital, for example at the NARI compound in Sapu, which was in the past and could be again a dynamic centre for rural regeneration. This relocation would serve to intensify the project's field presence while also strengthening its autonomy and identity.
Project support unit. Changes in the personnel of the PSU should be subject to the recruitment process set out in the Appraisal Report, and changes in the composition of the PSU require an explicit rationale. In a Rural Finance project, the PC should have a background in microfinance.
Monitoring and evaluation. A centralised M&E system should not be curtailed or downgraded. Participatory M&E is a useful tool to involve beneficiaries in the monitoring of impact but cannot replace a centralised monitoring system as a basis for decision-making.
Supervision. Effective supervision of the project requires continuity and appropriate expertise so that problems may be promptly diagnosed and resolved. The constant turnover at CPM level and the lack of a microfinance expert for the first seven missions seriously affected the quality of supervision.
1/ The Interim Evaluation Mission was composed of: Professor Roger Norman, Team Leader; Mr. Issa Barro, Microfinance Specialist; Mr. Sainey Keita, Agriculture Specialist; Mr. Mark Keating, Evaluation Information Officer, OE. Mr. Fabrizio Felloni, Lead Evaluator, (OE), carried out a preliminary visit in April 2004, designed the evaluation methodology and accompanied the mission from 11 July to 19 July 2004. The IE survey was carried out by Professor Sulayman Fye, University of The Gambia, in collaboration with Mr. Edrissa Ceesay, Statistician, Central Statistics Department and Mr. Musa Suso, Research Assistant, NARI together with a team of student enumerators from the University of The Gambia. Two of these enumerators, Mr. Lang Sanyang and Ms. Kaddy Jammeh, acted as interpreters for the IE mission during field trips.
2/ Summary ratings are shown in the text, details are in Annex III.
3 / On the non-appointment of the analyst and secretary for the RF component, the Mission acknowledges that no budget was provided in the Detailed Cost Tables.
4/ The ‘dedicated' M&E Officer in this instance means the officer specifically assigned to that task and no other. No comment is intended on the qualities of the previous incumbent, who was not met or interviewed by the Mission.
5/ The Mission never questioned that the correct proceedings were followed in appointing the Project Coordinators. It merely considered it unfortunate that a candidate without the appropriate background in microfinance was selected. This was, reportedly, because none of the candidates interviewed had such a background.
6/ Findo (Digitaria exilis and Digitaria iburua) is a local cereal variety.
7/ It is not suggested that the dismantling of the VISACA Promotion Centre was an easy task, but the Supervision must share in the responsibility for the long delay before any action was taken.
8/ The Mission found that the distinctions between RFCIP and non-RFCIP activities (in extension for example) were not clearly made in the districts where RFCIP was the major source of funding. This does not imply a misuse of funds.