Completion evaluation

Introduction

The Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (SOCODEP) was undertaken in the Southern Region of Ethiopia between 1994 and 2005. This document is the completion evaluation report for the project. The evaluation mission took place between 17th September and 11th October 2006. It was conducted by a four-man team and the conduct, analysis and reporting of the evaluation has been carried out according to the Office of Evaluation (OE) guidelines for project evaluations.

Country background

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a very large (1.1m km2), very diverse (geographically and ethnically), and extremely poor country. It ranks 170th out of 177 countries in the current (2006) Human Development Rankings. The predominantly rural population depends heavily on subsistence agricultural production, the vast majority of which exists under rainfed conditions. Cash incomes are very low except in coffee-producing areas, and access to rural financial services is very limited. Physical infrastructure (roads, power supplies, water and sanitation, and telecommunications) is very poorly developed. Population growth, increasing prevalence of the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), environmental degradation, and increasing climate instability are among the trends which add to the challenges of poverty alleviation in Ethiopia. Politically, Ethiopia has undergone a virtually continuous process of change since the 1974 revolution in which Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown. The Marxist rule of the Derg from 1974 to 1991 led to many reforms, but the authoritarian use of power over the peasantry did not change, or if anything, it became more restrictive. After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, a slow process of liberalisation of economy and political systems has taken place, but there is still a long way to go before the rural population will be fully able to participate in a free market and transparent democratic processes of government. There is no doubt that Ethiopia is a very difficult country in which to make progress in terms of development and poverty alleviation.

The Southern Region

At 232,000 km2, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of the four largest Regions in Ethiopia (out of the 9 Regions and 2 City Authorities into which the country is presently divided). It is probably the most diverse Region in ethnic terms, and it contains some of the most remote and wettest parts of Ethiopia. At the time of project commencement in 1994, the Region consisted of 53 Woredas (districts), and had a total population of about 11m. Twelve years later, at the time of the completion evaluation the number of Woredas had grown to 133 and the total population to about 14.5m. Mean population density in the Region has consequently increased from about 47 to 63 per km2, but these averages hide a great deal of variation; at Appraisal in 1994, population densities were thought to range from less than 10 to over 500 per km2. Rainfall, temperatures, altitudes, cropping patterns, infrastructure, and cultures vary widely within the Region.

The project

SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in Ethiopia following the fall of the Derg in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation (Proclamation 85/1994) concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members' interests. In particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their members. The Principal Objective of the Project was to "increase agricultural productivity and raise income levels of the rural poor through support to Service Cooperatives' development in order to facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members". The Project had 7 specific objectives which are set out in Table ES1 and further elaborated in the reconstructed logframe in Appendix 4. T

ogether these objectives were designed not only to turn Service Cooperatives (SCs) into effective vehicles for the service of their members, but also to deliver some specific services (road construction, veterinary drug supply, health facility up-grading, and provision of water supply and sanitation services) directly through the relevant Government organs. The Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation Component (WSHBS) was separately financed by the Belgian Survival Fund as a later addition to the Project. 

Table ES1.  SOCODEP specific objectives

SO1	Provide a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new legislation, particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas, which could be replicated in other areas of the country.
SO2	Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas with limited land for farm expansion.
SO3	Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development.
SO4	Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.
SO5	Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.
SO6	Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining rural roads.
SO7	(BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the SOCODEP area

Objectives and methodology of the evaluation

Overall objectives. The main objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance and impact of the SOCODEP project; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations that would serve the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Government of the Ethiopia, and other donors in designing and implementing similar projects and programmes in the future. The special focus of the evaluation, as highlighted in the Approach Paper, was to be on Cooperatives Development, Rural Microfinance, Socio-economic impact, and Institutional Capacity-Building.

Evaluation methodology. The evaluation followed OE's guidelines for project evaluations¹.

The evaluation team conducted a field visit to the project area and interviews with key stakeholders.  The evaluation notes the limited range of reports and other documents available through the project and partners due to the frequent moving of the project office which made it challenging to find many documents.

However, the core documents were available and provided a sufficient source of secondary data for the evaluation. As per standard OE practice, a Core Learning Partnership (CLP)² was constituted for the evaluation, which provided critical inputs and views at key stages of the evaluation process. 

Project performance

Implementation and outputs

Cooperatives restructuring (US$0.95m, four per cent of total budget at Appraisal). Cooperatives under the former Government (the Derg) were an instrument of Marxist ideology and coercion. A great deal of work would have to be done to turn these into autonomous businesses owned and democratically controlled by their members. The number of cooperatives restructured through SOCODEP under the new legislation exceeded the Appraisal target, 200, by about 30 per cent. Credit delivery (US$7.68m, 34 per cent of total budget at Appraisal).

Credit was to be delivered to cooperatives for their own businesses (flour mills, shops, produce marketing) and through the cooperatives to the individual members (for farm inputs, income-generating activities, small-scale enterprises, and work oxen). The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) was to be the channel for disbursement of loans to the restructured cooperatives. Overall, the disbursement of loans fell below target, at EB 18.76m by the time of closure of this project component. This is a little over US$2.0m or approximately 30 per cent of target. This low number of loans disbursed was attributable partly to project design shortcomings and partly to problems encountered during project implementation. Specific factors included: CBE's lack of experience in rural credit implementation; delays in loan processing; lack of capacity in the restructured Service Cooperatives (SC) to borrow and on lend; and defaults in loan repayment.

Promotion of off-farm income generating activities (US$0.29m, 1 per cent)

Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. Training was provided to 226 beneficiaries, in bamboo work, tailoring, weaving, spinning, woodwork, beekeeping and pottery. Loans for subsequent business development amounted to EB 55,456 (approximately US$8,000), three percent of the target, in total over the entire project period.  The Women Income Generating Activities (WIGAs) performed much better providing 7,600 loans (76 percent of the target) to women. 

Institutional capacity building

Capacity-building, through training and provision of physical resources, was a major aspect of the project. Explicit capacity building inputs focused on Southern Region Agricultural Bureau (US$2.80m, 12 per cent of total budget) to enable the Bureau to deliver support to the SCs and CBE (US$0.39m, two per cent) to provide effective rural finance to the SCs. But there were significant allocations also to the other Regional Government organs involved (Water, Health, and Roads), as well as to the cooperatives themselves.

As far as physical resources are concerned, the project provided large numbers of vehicles (65 cars, three buses, 300 motorcycles), as well as office accommodation, office equipment and road-building equipment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, disbursement for these items proceeded quickly, with large overdrafts on the vehicles and equipment category being highlighted in the 1997 and 1998 United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Supervision Reports.

Road construction (US$4.70m, 21 per cent)

The target at Appraisal was for the rehabilitation and heavy maintenance of a total of 700 km of rural roads, to a design standard that would permit labour-based maintenance. In the end, 122 km was constructed, to a higher standard (and consequently higher unit cost) than originally agreed.  Thus reducing the amount of construction and rehabilitation possible and requiring machine-based maintenance in the future.

Veterinary revolving drugs fund (US$1.89m, 8 per cent)

This was intended to be a complement to other project activities – specifically to help to protect the livestock which were involved in ox loans and credit for small ruminants. The first purchases of drugs under this component were delayed significantly, taking place in 2001, and resulted in only about 19 per cent of the budgeted funds being disbursed by the time of closure of the project loans.

Water supply, health and basic sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – Belgium Survival Fund (BSF) funded

Despite the assessment of a pre-Appraisal mission in 1993 that "…water supply is not a major problem in many parts of the project area … and in areas where needs are pronounced several NGOs are providing assistance", a formulation mission addressing this and the wider issues of health and sanitation was sent in 1996 and the component commenced in 1999.  This component has performed well meeting its targets related to health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and training) and construction of water supply points in the 8 component Woredas.

Assessment relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

• Relevance. SOCODEP addressed some real needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (need for credit, need for improved market access, need for better health services and environmental health) and it was consistent with the government's regionalization programme. At the time of design the rhetoric of the new Government and the framing of the new legislation made working through service cooperatives attractive and promising. However the use of service cooperatives as the channel for services to the poor turned out to be a significant design weakness.   Similarly, the project had limited choices for partners with rural finance experience and should have been addressed with greater seriousness.
• Effectiveness. The Project achieved some, but not all of its objectives. The Specific Objectives (SO) 1, 3, and 5 were mostly not met. These include SO1, providing a model for developing Ethiopian cooperatives under the new legislation, SO3 strengthening the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau (SRAB) to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development, and SO5 relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.  Specific Objectives 2, 4, 6 and 7 were met to varying degrees and include SO2 increasing capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating activities, SO4 providing credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives, SO6 improving access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and maintaining rural roads, and SO7 (BSF Component) reducing the burden of disease in eight woredas of the SOCODEP area.
• Efficiency. Given the difficult operating environment in Ethiopia the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and less ambitious.  The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.  Also, the overall emphasis on the Project's numerical outputs (i.e. exceeding the number of restructured cooperatives) rather than the quality of those outputs, has resulted in a significant amount of wasted resources.  As a result, many of the project's activities were diluted to the extent that they failed to achieve their intended outcomes.  Efficiency would have been greatly enhanced if the project design had concentrated on a smaller project area, involving a smaller number of SCs, and provided greater intensity of effort and resources.

Project impact by component 

Cooperatives restructuring

The number of cooperatives restructured through SOCODEP under the new legislation exceeded the Appraisal target by about 30 per cent. However, the quality of the restructuring and re-orientation undertaken has not translated into an effective cooperatives sector in the project areas. The cooperatives encountered in this evaluation, and many others for which data was obtained, are suffering significant problems of poor management, misappropriation of funds and de facto bankruptcy. The findings of the evaluation in this regard are not new. To quote the internal review of the project carried out in 1999: "…with such limited capital, unprofitable business, increased misappropriation, weak management, absence of member education, and poor participation of members, the conceptual framework of promoting economically viable cooperatives … could not be achieved."³

Three years later, at the time of closure of the main loans, the situation had not changed significantly: "…the state of some cooperatives restructured under the project appear to be weak and in the worst case on the verge of bankruptcy … most restructured cooperatives critically need the support of the project …"⁴ . In short, although SOCODEP re-registered about 267 cooperatives under the new law, it failed to re-orient the officers and members of those organisations, and leave behind a strong and sustainable cooperatives sector.

Credit delivery

The disbursement of loans achieved approximately 30 per cent of its target. Although many cooperatives and individuals received and benefited from loans, many of the target populations did not. Loans for cooperatives' own businesses were generally unsuccessful. Because the cooperatives found that they could not compete with the leaner and fitter private sector, the majority of these ventures failed, and the cooperatives failed to repay their loans.  Loans to individuals were generally much more successful, with ox loans being particularly popular (although the required ox insurance was not popular, and it failed to pay out in the majority of cases of mortality). Loans to women for the multiplication and fattening of small ruminants were also especially valued, and repayment rates were high. In general, repayment of loans was better in the western part of the project area than in the east and south-east.

CBE learned in the course of the project that provision of rural microfinance is a very different activity to the provision of commercial, urban, loans. It found it was ill-equipped to manage this project component, and it withdrew in 2002. The transfer of this component to the Region's only Omo Micro Finance Institution (OMFI) in the last few months before closure of project loans was the only solution to a crisis.  Because of the difficulties experienced by CBE, and the poor performance of many of the cooperatives, the opportunities for cooperatives or individuals to access further loans has been curtailed. Real benefits enjoyed by individuals made a difference for a time, but they may not have brought about lasting change. 

Promotion of off-farm income generating activities

Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. The impact of this activity on a few individuals was significant; however, the extent of that impact was negligible.

Institutional capacity building

A great deal of training was carried out (estimates suggest that nearly 57,000 individuals received some form of training). Individuals have benefited to some extent, but the ability of the project stakeholder institutions to perform more effectively, during and subsequent to the project, is questionable. A lasting impact on the institutions involved has been severely undermined by the capacity buildings component's ad hoc nature ⁵ and by the frequent Government restructuring and re-deployment of personnel.

SOCODEP's capacity-building efforts largely ignored issues of attitude change, organizational reform, and policy dialogue. These were major omissions.

Road construction

The roads built are of good quality and have benefited those people living near them.  The Roads Authority has been left with a useful pool of heavy equipment for future road construction work. As far as SOCODEP outcomes are concerned however, the aim of this aspect of the project was to extend access to markets for cooperatives and their members. As with other project components, a few people have benefited from the component, and its main shortcoming has been its limited reach. 

Veterinary revolving drugs fund

The component was able to provide temporary relief for the few participants who were able to access the fund. At the time of the evaluation, drug shortages were being felt, and animal health problems were reported to be increasing, especially in those areas where tyrpanomiasis is prevalent.

Water supply, health and basic sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – BSF funded

In some respects the WSBHS component has delivered the most visible and potentially successful aspects of the entire project, with its most effective aspects being the strengthening of health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and training) and construction of water supply points in the eight component Woredas.  However, the functional sustainability of water points, and the utilisation of improved excreta disposal facilities at household level, are areas of concern. In particular, user fees for water point maintenance are too low, and access to spare parts for hand pumps is extremely problematic.

Integration across components

SOCODEP was a multi-component project, involving at least 7 Regional Government organs ⁶, three financial institutions⁷ , and numerous other stakeholders ⁸. There were important potential synergies between components and stakeholders. The cooperatives were fundamental. Their capacity to function as viable democratic business entities would determine the extent to which all the individual project beneficiaries would gain. In the event, their lack of effective re-orientation and capacity-building has limited the extent to which individual men and women have enjoyed the benefits of cooperative membership. Credit disbursement depended on the sound functioning of both the cooperatives and CBE, as the financial intermediary. Neither the cooperatives nor CBE were effective in channelling loans to individual members.

Institutional strengthening of Government organs was greatly limited in its impact, because of the unsystematic and incomplete way in which it was done, and because of frequent Government restructuring. Supply of veterinary drugs, construction of roads, enhancement of health services, and construction of water supplies and sanitation facilities were carried out as separate activities, and in the case of the first two, very little was actually achieved. The potential synergies were not realised, and the project as a whole could not be described as integrated.

SOCODEP Assessment

Table 2 summarizes the ratings attributed to the project by the evaluation, with the average ratings given to project evaluated in 2005 for comparison. On many criteria SOCODEP scored one point under the 2005 average. Impact on physical, financial and human assets is comparable with 2005 averages, but the performance of the Southern Region Government is assessed as particularly below the 2005 average. Because of fundamental weaknesses in project implementation, caused partly by unrealistic design, partly by insufficiently decisive management, partly by insufficient political commitment, and partly by externalities including frequent Government restructuring and reshuffling, SOCODEP is assessed overall by this evaluation as ‘Moderately  unsuccessful' (rating of 3).

Table ES2. SOCODEP project performance: rating summary

Source: The Evaluation Mission 2007

Conclusions, recommendations and key issues for the future

Conclusions 

As with most multi-component projects, the project performance and impacts of SOCODEP have been mixed. There seems little doubt that the Project has had a net benefit to the Region, to individuals in Government, and to some of the target beneficiaries. The key questions relate to understanding how the benefits could have been greater, and what lessons can be learned for present and future projects in Ethiopia and further a field.

Context. SOCODEP was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in Ethiopia following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members' interests. In particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their members. 

Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph 31, was an imaginative attempt to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives.  However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight an unrealistic goal.  A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the SOCODEP. First, the Region's size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.  Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of the government for implementation in the post Derg period. 

Quality of project delivery. SOCODEP concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as  cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, ilometres of road constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.

However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and community health workers performed better.

Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to needs of the rural poor in southern Ethiopia (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government's regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment in Ethiopia, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.

Sustainability. SOCODEP's benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit, and water supply is not assured.

Innovation. At the time of design, SOCODEP's focus on cooperatives and credit represented a response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the Mid-term Review (MTR), the design adjustments were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF component introduced an effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not integrated into the other project components. As the project was overstretched and its components were not integrated, SOCODEP offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed back into the project. Hence, the evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in terms of innovations, replicability and upscaling.

Policy dialogue. SOCODEP was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to IFAD's effective engagement in policy dialogue in the country.

Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are most likely to succeed in the short and long term.

Integration. This evaluation report has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration between the numerous stakeholders and components within SOCODEP. Although integration is not easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.

Management. The management model used by SOCODEP limited its effectiveness and responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation.  The Project Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from IFAD through supervision mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was insufficient. However, it should be recognized that during the time of SOCODEP, IFAD did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to support project implementation. Although, IFAD was responsive in using the tools it had at the time, for example by undertaking an early and useful MTR and facilitating the inclusion during implementation of the important BSF component. 

Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key stakeholders have mainly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at various stages of the Project), IFAD's Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project Coordinator's role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM's role is distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an under-performing project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.

Recommendations

Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall framework of IFAD's targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty.  Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration and harmonization among different implementing agencies.

Quality of project delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality, and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.

Policy dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just IFAD and cooperating institution staff.

Participation. It is recommended that future IFAD-funded projects and programmes in Ethiopia pay more attention to people's participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of development practice in Ethiopia in the past.

Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully considered.

Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as found in SOCODEP. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new approaches be explored, either through IFAD itself taking a more hands-on role during execution, facilitated by the Fund's field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to implementation.

Role of the field presence officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide implementation support to IFAD-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and policy dialogue in Ethiopia. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can play a greater role in enhancing IFAD's development effectiveness in Ethiopia.

Questions for the forthcoming country programme evaluation (CPE)

In view of the CPE for Ethiopia which is planned for 2007, a number of key questions arise from the present evaluation, which should be addressed in that context. These are:

Have the present project identification, formulation and appraisal processes encouraged the setting of unrealistic targets and spreading project of activities too thinly? If so, how can these tendencies be avoided in future?;

Are the existing project identification, formulation and appraisal processes sufficiently participative, in a country in which participation is not a strong tradition?

If not, can they be made more so?

To what extent have the detailed capacities of project stakeholder institutions been routinely assessed at the formulation stage, in order to design appropriate capacity-building programmes? What improvements can be made to this process?

What has been the impact of the BSF contributions in Ethiopia?  How can the partnership be enhanced in future activities?

How can the present model of project management and supervision be modified to create a significantly greater degree of the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) authority and effectiveness, without de-coupling projects from the implementing institutions? Should separate project management structures be set up, perhaps using consulting firms, or can the existing PCU framework be made more effective? How could the field presence officer be more effective? What model best fits the Ethiopian context? Should clearer guidelines be framed, setting out responsibilities for taking actions on supervision and MTR recommendations? Where does the buck stop in terms of project management?; and

In view of the weak performance of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in some Ethiopian projects, how can a monitoring culture be encouraged, and how can manageable frameworks be developed and implemented for monitoring of project performance, reflecting both quantitative and qualitative achievements?

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1/ This included assessing the project against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) impact on rural poverty; and (iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including IFAD, government institutions, and others.

2/ Members of the partnership included: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and rural Development, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), Department of Cooperatives, SNNPRS, Rural Women's Affairs Team, SNNPRS, Bureau of Health, SNNPRS, Bureau of Water Resources, SNNPRS, Planning and Programme Department, Rural Roads Authority, SNNPRS, Sodo Rural Technology Centre, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Omo Microfinance Institution, the Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, Former SOCODEP Project Director, field presence officer, and the IFAD Country Programme Manager.

3/ SNNPRS Cooperative Office (1999) Comprehensive Analaysis of Current Situation and Requirements of Cooperatives in SOCODEP Areas, April 1999, Awassa.

4/ UNOPS Supervision Report, April 2002.

5/ The evaluation team could find no evidence of any systematic training needs assessment.

6/ Those responsible for Agriculture, Cooperatives, Veterinary Services, Water, Health, Finance & Planning, and Roads, organised in different ways at different times.

7/ CBE, OMFI, and Ethiopian Insurance Corporation.

8/ Cooperatives and their members, contractors, and consultants.