Interim evaluation

Introduction

The Ixtlera region is a semi-arid area covering 155 000 square kilometres in north-eastern Mexico, spanning parts of the states of San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas (the last three share a border with the United States). The region is home to industrial cities and high-yielding agricultural and mining areas, as well as to poor, marginalized communities whose productive resources are limited owing to the scarce supply of water.

The interim evaluation mission for the Development Project for Marginal Rural Communities in the Ixtlera Region (also known as the "Ixtlera project") conducted its field work from 5 to 30 October 1998. The mission used an evaluation methodology based on a representative sample. Eighty-nine of the 828 communities served by the project were visited; they were selected on a random basis and were spread across 23 of the 36 Ixtlera municipalities. During these visits, some 900 residents were interviewed. Field data were discussed with the executing units, university professors, and staff of public and private-sector agencies; the review was rounded out by an analysis of the ample information available at the project executing unit.

Design of the Ixtlera Project

The Ixtlera project was designed in accordance with the IFAD strategy agreed upon with the Secretariat of Programming and Budget and Nacional Financiera in 1988, namely: (i) support the decentralization of assistance to the poorest of the rural communities by way of state-endorsed non-governmental organizations, which led to the selection of La Forestal as the executing agency for the project; (ii) promote the financing of rural development on the basis of effective recovery of investments and credit administered by Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural (BANRURAL); and (iii) foster diversification of poor farmers' output to include crops having greater market value, while ensuring the production of basic grains for self-consumption.

Socio-economic context and institutional reform

Mexico's socio-economic and institutional context has seen sweeping changes over the seven years of project implementation, in a way impossible to foresee when the project was originally designed and the loan agreement signed. The following paragraphs present a summary of the main changes.

Article 27 of the Constitution was amended and national land-reform and water legislation was enacted in late 1992.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has had an impact on the agricultural sector by creating protective measures (such as PROCAMPO) and setting deadlines for deregulating trade in nine farm products, including maize, beans, wheat and oats, which are grown by Ixtlera farmers.

The decentralization process has been changing the way in which financial resources are transferred from the national to local governments.

The Emergency Economic Programme brought with it such measures as a floating exchange rate, radical adjustments to monetary and fiscal policy, and wage controls.

These changes have had significant repercussions on project implementation. For instance, La Forestal was replaced with Comisión Nacional de Zonas Aridas (CONAZA) as the executing agency; and BANRURAL decided to withdraw from managing the project's credit component.

The fiscal adjustments implemented under the Emergency Economic Programme resulted in a paring back of the project's budget, as of 1995, to one half the amount spent annually in the two previous years. This meant: (i) reducing the number of communities served from 1 193 to 828; (ii) cutting back on investments, mainly in the area of water works; and (iii) downsizing the project's overall cost from USD 53.3 million to USD 41.1 million, with IFAD's financing remaining unchanged at USD 30 million equivalent, although the Government's contribution dropped from USD 23.3 million to USD 11.1 million.

The physical setting and Ixtlera communities

With its semi-arid climate, the Ixtlera region has a low rural-population density of 5.2 inhabitants per square kilometre, which is a reflection of the scarce natural resources available for production purposes. With rainfall sparse and erratic, and droughts not uncommon, the possibilities for rainfed agriculture are limited.

The targeted communities are situated mainly in areas having an annual average precipitation of between 200 and 500 mm. Area residents are, for the most part, poor farmers who live in scattered settlements that are connected by dirt roads or tracks that allow for vehicle traffic. The semi-arid expanses that they work hold only marginal agricultural potential.

These farmers derive 15% of their income from dry farming, 40% from livestock-raising (mainly goats), 5% from the harvesting of ixtle, and the remaining 40% from salaried work outside the ejido (in this text, ejido and community are used as synonyms).

During the frequent droughts (such as the one that coincided with project implementation in 1994-96), rainfed crops are lost, so livestock-raising and the harvesting of native plant species take on greater importance; there is also a surge in emigration as area residents leave in search of work. Between 1990 and 1997, 32% of the population of these communities left their ejidos in search of employment and better opportunities.

The five states involved in the project have made a major effort to provide these communities with basic services and infrastructure for rural development. The only shortcoming that can be cited is the low number of rural clinics; this is hindering some key initiatives to combat poverty, such as the Health, Food and Education Programme (PROGRESA), which is aimed at reducing undernourishment among pre-school children and nursing mothers.

Evaluation

The mission feels it was a good idea to appoint CONAZA as the executing agency, for the following three reasons: (i) CONAZA reports directly to the Social Development Secretariat (SEDESOL), which is the agency with the broadest experience in implementing poverty-alleviation and rural-development programmes in Mexico; (ii) it is Mexico's largest depository of information on the fragile situation of arid and semi-arid areas, acquired through more than 25 years of study and work in these areas; and (iii) it has expertise in simple, low-cost water-works techniques, acquired during its ten years of operation as an agency of the Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources.

Achievements

The improvement perceived in the beneficiaries' living conditions and income is an indication of the project's positive impact on its target group. Following numerous visits and interviews, the mission was able to corroborate a visible improvement for women and farmers in the following areas: income (due to their production activities); satisfaction and interest, on the women's side, due to the availability of work and the possibility of earning their own income; improvement in their lifestyle due to access to potable water in the households; increased security and stability regarding production.

The project's production activities have a diverse degree of sustainability. All hydraulics and water conservation works can be maintained at a low cost. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that the beneficiaries, through their increase in production, will preserve these works. The same can be said, and in a larger scale, about irrigation work.

The activities implemented by CONAZA conform to the needs and priorities of the farmers' communities. There is no doubt that the most tangible productive activity, which has given visible results in development and diversification according to project design, was the planting of alfalfa under irrigation. The mission observed various cultivation of this forage, from 30 to 60 ha in various communities (Cienega de Rocamontes, Noria de Guadalupe, S. Francisco de Berlanga, S. Cruz, etc.). The cultivation is technically correct, productive, with a yield per hectare of around 50-100 tons of forage, which are transformed into bales of medium-dry hay (coefficient of transformation = 0.25-0.30). What is more important is that there is a market for this forage: one bale of 25-30 kg is sold at 30-35 pesos. Additionally, alfalfa is also utilised to increase milk production, thus contributing to the diversification and improvement of daily nutrition. Alfalfa is highly productive and its diffusion will probably increase in the future.

The project has also supported livestock development through modules and sharecropping. These two actions deserve particular attention. There is no doubt that they both generated positive results for the more disadvantaged families and women. The modules are organized as follows: a certain number of animals (bovine, goat, sheep or bees) are given to a group of women, including a technology package, with an agreement that includes rules for the reimbursement of invested capital, generally after a five-year period. However, in case of lack of repayment, no sanctions have been established. This amount will be used for similar actions, and the women can decide which activities to undertake. Sharecropping is similar to modules, except that the repayment is in kind and the animals are passed on to other groups. In the case of women, it seems that modules respond better to their needs.

The project has also achieved significant objectives of technological changes. The most important are the following: planting under irrigation (alfalfa, chilli pepper, corn, forage sorghum, broom sorghum) with improved seed; pumping equipment; rangeland management (fenced), planting in contour line pastures, soil vibration; rainfed production (improved seed, planting, use of fertilizers, fungicides – improved varieties); animal health management (vaccination, nutrition supplements, internal and external parasite extermination and genetic improvement); reforestation of cortadillo; run-off water management; introduction to a variety of improved fruit trees (plums, peach, apricot); small industrialization of pork; transformation of dairy products; small micro enterprises for the processing of fibre into rope; small processing plants for marmalade and juice production.

One of the project's most significant achievement is that it has set up decentralized multidisciplinary teams (one per state) that display good work organization and have used a rural extension methodology that fosters effective community participation in the selection and execution of activities. This has promoted broad-based acceptance of the project by the communities.

The support provided to Ixtlera women was another noteworthy accomplishment. The project has significantly improved women's living conditions by including them in production-oriented projects, thus opening up new social, employment and educational spaces that have reshaped and enhanced women's role on the ejido, particularly in the ejido councils.

The adult literacy activities are yet another of the project's accomplishments. Literacy agents are members of the community, usually women with a secondary education who have received training from the National Adult Education Institute [Instituto Nacional de Educación de Adultos] (INEA), which conducts the final evaluations of students and also provides the teaching materials. The literacy agents are paid by the project. The results of the evaluations are similar to those obtained in literacy courses offered by INEA staff, with the advantage that the cost is less. Other advantages include: (i) the community ties established by the project's extension agents are tapped in conjunction with INEA's previously validated teaching methodology; (ii) class schedules can be adjusted to students' needs; and (iii) the literacy agents are available in the community when students have questions.

A further, significant achievement has been the ability of the project's multidisciplinary teams to mobilize additional support for Ixtlera communities in the form of grants to boost agricultural productivity and attenuate the impact of droughts. Between 1995 and 1997, project units in the various participating states obtained USD 1.1 million in additional aid, which was used to carry out 312 specific activities that yielded benefits for 3 960 ejido residents.

Strengths

The strengths shown by CONAZA and the project, respectively, are:

1. CONAZA's ability to build simple, low-cost irrigation works to increase water supply; and
2. the work performed by the project's multidisciplinary teams in promoting the organization and economy of Ixtlera communities, which integrated CONAZA's primarily technical work with actions aiming at (a) human and community development in the ejidos, as well as (b) participation of beneficiaries in the management of water works, to assure long-term sustainability of hydro-technical investments.

Weaknesses

The above-mentioned strengths need to be expanded and explicitly integrated into CONAZA's operational strategy in the project area, with a clear linkage between activities and better-defined objectives, sequences and timing of execution, in order to consolidate results, strengthen community organization and improve the ixtlero farmers income.

So far, CONAZA and the project executing unit (PEU) have been operating virtually as independent agencies, with very little coordination. Efforts to work together under a joint strategy have been sporadic, owing to the high turnover of CONAZA's management (four general managers between 1993 and 1998), the arcane procedures for releasing funds and hiring staff in the various areas into which the government budget is divided at the federal and state levels, the lack of an executive director at the PEU during the first three years and, by extension, the lack of greater autonomy in project management.

Additionally, owing to the rapid pace of change and the marked tendency to measure achievements in terms of works executed rather than results obtained, CONAZA lacks a strategy in its capacity as an agency of the social development sector. Taking into consideration the ability in carrying out hydro-technical works demonstrated by CONAZA, having such a strategy would place CONAZA in the unique position of being the only agency specialized in the development of marginal rural communities in arid and semi-arid regions, which make up two thirds of Mexico's territory.

Management and coordination

The President's Report called for the creation of an advisory committee: for all intents and purposes, this committee has been inoperative. The mission feels that the project suffered from this lack of an advisory committee to which it could turn for advice on key problems that arose during execution. Reactivating this committee would help to consolidate the project, especially for formulating a development strategy for the Ixtlera region, as recommended herein.

Overall, project management has been good. The mission was favourably impressed with the work of the chiefs and professional staff of the state teams, who are to be credited with most of the project's success.

The largest problems stemmed from the cumbersome procedures for defining the project's budget and releasing approved funds. The project budget comes under heading XXVI of SEDESOL's Programme for the Social and Productive Development of Poor Regions, which only allows for short-term hirings (three to twelve months). This personnel is not entitled to employment benefits or job security.

The other two noteworthy features of heading XXVI are that: (i) pursuant to the Federal-State Social Development Agreement, disbursements are made directly to the states, which have the final say on how funds are used within their jurisdictions; and (ii) since the procedures are so complicated, funds are not available until June, although in some cases release can be delayed as late as August, as happened in 1998.

The serious implications of such complicated budget procedures have been underscored on several occasions in the UNOPS supervisory reports. In this connection, the mission has been informed that SEDESOL was reviewing the operations manual for heading XXVI with a view to streamlining disbursement procedures for the 1999 budget.

The project's staffing chart showed a total staff of 135 persons, of whom 37% worked in the PEU and 67% in the five state offices (jefaturas estatales) in 1997. The mission observed that: (i) staff turnover was high, considering that over a two-year period 28% of the staff had changed positions or left the project altogether; and (ii) the PEU staffing chart included personnel that only worked part-time on project activities (if at all), and this led to high administrative costs.

Administrative costs accounted for 30% of the project's investments in 1997. This level is very high and needs to be examined in detail. UNOPS has suggested a series of measures to ensure greater control in the project's administration.

Monitoring and evaluation, so important to an innovative project like this one, have not received proper attention. The M&E unit disappeared early on (1995) and was not revived until 1998. The mission feels that a systematic analysis of data gathered on the impact of changes in the communities' setting and those promoted by the project would yield valuable recommendations for framing a development strategy for marginal communities in the Ixtlera region.

The other operations areas had up-to-date records and, overall, presented good results. Budget execution has varied between 94% and 98% of the authorized amounts. According to the internal and external audits, funds and records of assets are being handled adequately. The semi-annual and annual progress reports furnish ample information on the work and activities carried out.

Results

Given the region's arid climate, communities tended to ask for water works that would address the problem of the extreme scarcity of water. The participatory methodology made it very clear that the Ixtlera communities rank water works in the following order of priority: (i) those that provide good quality water for human consumption; (ii) those that provide water for animals; and (iii) those that help to secure crop production.

The appraisal mission estimated that a total of 1 260 water works would be built (64% for crop purposes), benefiting 184 000 persons. In fact, the project has built 1 220 such works, virtually the same as the target number, benefiting 160 000 persons. The difference is that only 30% of the works built were for crop purposes.

The drinking-water works built under the project match the appraisal mission's estimates in terms of total number, amount of investment and number of beneficiaries. The difference lies in the type of works built. The appraisal mission felt that 60% of these works would be cisterns and 40% would be drinking-water systems: of the works built under the project, 64% are systems and 36% are cisterns. In other words, area residents prefer the better quality water of the springs and wells that supply the drinking-water systems to the run-off water that supplies the cisterns.

The result of the construction and rehabilitation of drinking-water works is that 78% of the communities served by the project currently have such service, compared with the 64% estimated by the appraisal evaluation in 1990.

The appraisal mission thought it would be difficult to support livestock-raising activities on the ejidos (mainly goat-raising) and, accordingly, it attached less importance to watering points. An estimated 200 points were to be rehabilitated for watering animals owned by 72 000 inhabitants of Ixtlera communities, at a cost of USD 0.5 million. During the execution phase, the project built and rehabilitated 535 watering points (2.5 times the original estimate) at a total cost of USD 5.06 million (ten times the original estimate), with benefits accruing to 40 800 residents.

The huge difference between the number of watering points estimated by the appraisal mission and those actually built or rehabilitated under the project confirms the importance of livestock as a source of income for farmers in these marginal communities.

The appraisal mission estimated that 750 diversion dams would be built, 750 plots would be prepared for rainfed agriculture, and 60 irrigation wells would be rehabilitated. In fact, the project has built only 216 diversion dams (i.e., 29% of the original estimate) but 150 irrigation wells (over twice the number originally estimated).

The low number of diversion dams built reflects the low importance that these farmers attach to rainfed agriculture and diversion dams in times of drought.

The higher number of wells and extremely efficient irrigation systems rehabilitated under the project can be attributed to the following: (i) ejido members now actually own their property, as the result of recent legal reforms; (ii) Alianza para el Campo subsidized up to 50% of the cost of equipment for improving irrigation technology and obtaining more efficient water use; and (iii) the new land-reform legislation allows peasant farmers to form groups based on family ties for the purpose of working privately-owned irrigated areas within the ejido.

Aside from the watering points, investments in livestock activities included the construction of 130 kilometres of fence, rehabilitation and improvement of 3 550 hectares of arid rangeland, planting of 90 hectares of prickly pear for forage, and delivery of 97 breeding modules for goats and six for cattle. The total investment came to USD 630 000, of which 75% was for goat-raising activities.

With regard to changes in production patterns that may have been triggered by the project, no direct data are available that would allow the interim evaluation mission to reach conclusions based on objectively verifiable information, since the project has not collected such information on a systematic basis.

The data available on livestock activities are inconsistent as concerns the project's impact on the production and size of the goat and cattle herds. Data on crop production are somewhat more consistent. The areas planted to rainfed maize and beans have shrunk, but yields have increased slightly vis-à-vis the appraisal evaluation. In 1998, the area planted to maize and beans was 60% and 23% lower, respectively, than in 1990-91. Crop yields rose from 0.5 and 0.2 metric tons/hectare, respectively, for maize and beans in 1990-91 to 0.6 and 0.25 metric tons/hectare in 1998, representing an increase of 20% that has been attributed to the use of improved seed.

The area under irrigation increased by 16% but there was no significant diversification of production, owing mainly to the pastureland subsidy provided by Alianza para el Campo. This subsidy funds 50% of the cost of setting aside pastureland, giving preference to the planting of alfalfa under irrigation, which is a crop known to the farmers as being easy to manage and having a guaranteed market because of the drought.

Since production neither increased nor was diversified, the planned expansion of agroindustry and marketing services did not materialize.

Two key features of the training component have been the irrigation workshops, which have exceeded appraisal expectations, and the literacy and organizational training provided to women, which was not contemplated in the appraisal evaluation.

The credit component fell short of expectations, because: (i) legislative reforms and new regulations in the state banking system prevented BANRURAL from administering credit; (ii) the high interest rates that prevailed throughout the project execution period, combined with the government subsidies, acted as disincentives for credit; and (iii) the government has no policy for financing small-scale producers in high-risk marginal areas.

Project supervision

The interim evaluation mission felt that UNOPS had supervised the project well, especially during the past two years in which it assumed an important role in enhancing coordination between the construction of works and activities to achieve better results, insistence on greater autonomy for the PEU, the need to set up a monitoring and evaluation unit, and the targeting of project activities at the poorest of the marginal communities.

Impact on the communities

The communities targeted by the project are currently going through a transition period. The legal and institutional reforms of recent years are having an impact on the ejidos and on the organized groups, families and individuals that make up this unique, Mexican form of farmer organization.

Within the ejidos, members and their families have total freedom to form groups for a variety of purposes: production, small-scale industry and community welfare. The project's greatest impact has been on production-oriented organizations and small-scale industries; not only were they part of the project's main objective, but they were also the areas most requested in the participatory programming.

The mission assessed the degree of consolidation of organizations within the ejido – as an indicator of the level of development and sustainability – and identified three types: (i) consolidated organizations, which had relatively higher levels of development, leadership and self-sustainability, accounted for 25% of the sample of communities evaluated; (ii) semi-consolidated organizations, which lacked some of the requisite basic operational resources and had weak financial and administrative management, constituted the largest group and accounted for 55% of the sample; and (iii) weak organizations (20%), which were thus classified because they only operated sporadically and had a high member-desertion rate, as a result of the impression that the organization did not bring them any benefits.

The groups interviewed did not manifest any special feeling that project support and benefits needed to be ploughed back in order to ensure the sustainability of this kind of assistance, or that they could be extended to benefit other marginal communities. This attitude can be ascribed to the long years of the political, assistance-oriented approach, which has fostered a deeply-ingrained mentality of free assistance from the state.

Sustainability

In the mission's opinion, only 25% to 30% of the communities served by the project had sufficient human resources and organizational structure to survive without continued external support. Of the remaining 70%, between 20% and 25% of the communities considered to be semi-consolidated could – if they received priority attention – reach self-sufficiency in the time remaining during the consolidation phase. One half of the communities would still require additional assistance after the final disbursement of IFAD funds for the Ixtlera project.

Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

The Ixtlera project was implemented during a period of legal and institutional reforms that spawned far-reaching changes in development policies and strategies and yielded valuable recommendations and lessons learned. This has also been a period of transition; one in which the recommendations and lessons learned from project execution should be tapped by CONAZA to formulate a strategy for the future sustainable development of marginal rural communities in arid and semi-arid regions.

The target population draws its income from a variety of productive activities. The most secure and highest-yielding sources are livestock-raising (mainly goats) and work outside the community. Rainfed agriculture is very uncertain, and the harvesting of native species holds some potential but needs to be evaluated objectively, i.e., by comparing these species with alternative products with which they will compete on the market, such as synthetic fibres, in the case of ixtle.

Out-migration from these areas is a necessity and fulfils two key functions: (i) it offers a source of family income and savings; and (ii) it eases population pressure in a fragile ecosystem, especially given the risk of desertification if the system's natural recovery capacity is exceeded. Structured out-migration should be part of the aforementioned development strategy.

The development of these communities should be a coordinated rural-development process that spans several years and should include the provision of basic infrastructure and services, which, in Mexico, is a function that falls to the federal, state, and municipal governments; the potential of the communities and their component groups should also be developed, with an eye to better organization and the promotion of productive economic and social activities.

Legal and institutional reforms in Mexico's rural and agricultural sectors have created a vacuum in the area of assistance for marginal communities. Nevertheless, the project has successfully carried out this function in the five states, using a participatory methodology for the programming and execution of activities. This assistance function is performed by multidisciplinary teams that work in constant dialogue with beneficiary communities and groups.

CONAZA, as the executing institution, has lent strong support for the achievement of some of the project's targets, but it was unable to isolate the project completely from political interference, which has affected performance and is jeopardizing the stability of the field staff. If this interference is not minimized, the project runs the risk of losing its human capital, and its positive achievements could be lost as well.

The works and activities recommended by the assistance teams should be evaluated carefully, especially with regard to operation and maintenance needs and results. Some of the recommended water works (e.g., the cisterns) should be evaluated to compare their advantages and disadvantages with such alternatives as rooftop catchment tanks (techos cuencas). Similarly, the diversion dams built in ixtle areas do not produce guaranteed results for rainfed maize and bean crops; furthermore, they are inoperative during times of drought.

In the absence of a policy for financing farmers in high-risk areas, communities shied away from high-interest credit; and small loans – with their high administrative costs – are not attractive to commercial or state-run banks. The past two years have seen the arrival of some federal programmes (e.g., special savings accounts [cajas de ahorro solidario]) that might be a possibility for these farmers but they need to be evaluated more closely.

During the Ixtlera project, financing for marginal communities consisted mainly of a mix of federal subsidies aimed at funding a limited number of productive activities that created jobs and income. As a result, the large pool of resources originally intended for the project's own credit system was left untouched.

Recommendations

With the experience gained in executing this project, CONAZA is on its way to becoming the only SEDESOL agency specialized in the rural development of arid and semi-arid areas, which make up two thirds of Mexico's territory.

In the time remaining before project close-out, CONAZA and the PEU should complete the project's consolidation phase. Among other things, CONAZA should formulate a strategy for the sustainable development of marginal communities in arid and semi-arid regions.

Completing the two phases will require a concerted effort to organize, analyse and draw conclusions from the abundant and valuable body of project information. The following recommendations apply to the consolidation phase:

(i) appoint an officer and set up a team to oversee consolidation work in keeping with the guidelines set forth in the attached annex;

(ii) set up a project advisory committee, which is to approve the terms of reference of the work and staffing/consultant needs and orient and supervise performance of that work; and

(iii) set a deadline of two months for formulating a work plan for the consolidation phase and present it for consideration by the chiefs of the project units and CONAZA representatives in the Ixtlera states and for approval by the project advisory committee.

The sustainability phase is the more important one for CONAZA's future work and it should be carried out by the same team, with support from short-term consultants and a target completion date of October 1999. This phase should produce, as an outcome, a proposed strategy for the post-loan phase to guide CONAZA in overseeing the sustainable development of marginal communities in arid and semi-arid areas. The proposal should be examined at a workshop with Mexican experts on the development of arid and semi-arid areas.

The main topics to be analysed during the sustainability phase are:

(i) the institutional setting, defining the functions of CONAZA and of the municipalities vis-à-vis marginal communities in arid and semi-arid regions, and forms of cooperation to achieve self-sustaining rural development in these communities;

(ii) the strengthening and modernization of ejido organization and of family groups within the ejido, to make them facilitators and agents of the progress of ejido families;

(iii) support for women in these communities, so they may better perform their traditional roles of wife and mother, alongside their new roles of participating in the government of the community and in productive activities;

(iv) the role of out-migration in these communities and how to provide support so that migrants are better prepared when they leave, and so that migration will be as structured as possible;

(v) the supply of health care, education and basic infrastructure for rural development, defining the roles of the state, the municipalities and CONAZA, and the responsibilities of each in high-risk areas where water is very scarce; and

(vi) financial and technical assistance to consolidate and develop employment and income-generating activities with the communities, as well as supplementary assistance in the form of temporary subsidies that foster activities but do not create dependency.

Once approved by CONAZA's board, the strategy proposal should be widely disseminated in the states and municipalities located in arid and semi-arid regions.

Strategy-formulation activities would be funded under the heading "Studies" (line V) in the Ixtlera project budget.

Lessons learned

As this report shows, it is possible for a project such as the Ixtlera project to survive and progress against a backdrop of sweeping institutional change. However, these changes do not come without a cost. Indeed, the project was able to adjust to the change in the executing agency, and CONAZA showed its ability to move forward with the project and attain most of the targets. At the same time, however, a key conceptual feature of the project design was sacrificed: the strengthening of a regional producer organization that would increase the possibility of maintaining production support services after IFAD support was withdrawn. Since that is one of the functions that CONAZA is called on to provide, it did not pursue this area of the project. It focused on what it knew best how to do: build works and meet targets. The fact that such a situation could arise, and that it should have been foreseen, was mentioned in the analysis undertaken by IFAD prior to authorizing the change of the executing institution; during execution, though, this critical change was overlooked, and it was not until recently that UNOPS – and now the interim evaluation mission – raised this crucial issue. What features of the project are sustainable from an institutional standpoint? What can be done to ensure this sustainability?

For the various water works that were carried out, the project ensured a participatory role for the communities by adopting an innovative methodology in which decision-making was shared by the community and the project, eschewing previous practice whereby decisions were made only by the institutions. This more participatory work methodology was welcomed by the communities and in many of them it has generated greater responsibility for maintaining the works.

The monitoring and evaluation system – as a key instrument of support for project management – did not receive the proper attention, as explained in the report. The resulting lack of information makes it impossible to measure the full impact of the project, especially with regard to the feature that received the most attention in the project's design: the introduction of major changes in the intensity and diversity of productive activities based on better use of water.

This situation can be ascribed to the project's lack of interest in measuring the costs and benefits of the productive activities being promoted. The project did not seek to establish a link between the cost of building a work, the cost of cultivating an area brought into production thanks to that work, and the net benefit after the product is sold. This lack of interest in defining costs and benefits and in having a monitoring and evaluation system is not attributable so much to the project as to the fact that the institutions linked to the project do not use these tools systematically and, accordingly, there is no institutional culture for using them.