Mid-term evaluation report

The Gambia has a total area of 10 400 square kilometres and lies on the West Coast of Africa. It consists of a narrow strip of land 10 Kilometres wide on either bank of The Gambia River; stretching from its mouth eastward for 400 kilometres. The population was one million in 1994, growing at an annual rate of 4.1% . The climate is sub-tropical and annual average rainfall varies from 2 200 mm in coastal areas to 800 mm inland. The topography is riverine flats and swamps (lowlands), leading up gradually to highlands up to 50 m above sea level. The lower and central river section has areas of actual and potential acid sulphate soils and saline-alkaline soils. Sea water intrudes upstream when there are low discharge rates of the river into the sea; and the salt water boundry moves upstream in the dry season. During the last two decades a significant migration upstream of the salinity front took place due to repeated droughts. The project is located in MacCarthy Island Division (MID), about 300 km east of Banjul, the capital. Annual average rainfall is 850 mm and the dry season extends from November to May. Main highland crops are groundnuts, maize millet and sorghum. Rice is grown mainly in the lowlands. In the Western half of the project area double cropping of rice is impossible due to saline intrusion.

Project design and objectives

The project is the second IFAD financed lowland rice development project in The Gambia. Its strategy has been based on lessons from experiences derived from the first rice project, JPSP which were: (i) the lack of sustainability and replicability of capital intensive large-scale pump irrigation schemes; (ii) the importance of involving farmers at design and implementation of schemes; (iii) the need to minimize land reallocation to avoid complex land tenure issues; (iv) the need to avoid complex water management systems so that farmers can be easily involved in their operations and management; (v) labour shortage as an essential constraint; and (vi) the appropriation by men of women's plots when yields increase following technological improvement. With these lessons in mind, the overall design objectives were to increase rice production, income and household food security for women rice cultivators in the lowlands (swamps) of MID.

Target group

Women were intended to be the project's main target group as they constitute the bulk of swamp rice producers. At the household level, crop production is divided between upland and lowland areas. Traditionally, the former is the responsibility of men, while the lowlands are cultivated by women. Women have user-rights over swamp plots and enjoy only limited ownership rights. Land allocation is controlled by traditional authorities (the Alkalo at village level or the Seyfo at the district level). At household level (average size 10 persons), the male head divides the land at his disposal into communal fields (maruo) and personal fields (kamanyango). Households lowland plots are often distributed over several swamps. Women in swamps cultivate maruo and kamanyango plots and have to walk long distance between swamps and from the villages in the upland. Average size of landholding in the swamps is about 0.1 ha. A total of 6 350 plot holders were meant to benefit from the project (one per household) of these 4 100 persons are within the swamps and 2 250 are in other areas of MID (through project's support to farming systems). At the time of Appraisal 60% of the population in MID had incomes 40% below the poverty line.

Objectives and components

Objectives. Project objectives include: a) promoting environmentally sound water control schemes in the lowlands of MID and the improvement of crop husbandry techniques to increase rice production; b) establishing a participatory framework for swamp rice development; c) easing women's workload through the use of labour saving equipment; and d) promoting income-generating activities and crop diversification. The project approach would be based on participation of beneficiaries in project design, implementation and evaluation and new technologies will only be introduced if they enhance indigenous systems rather than create "new systems" of production.

Components: Water control development (60% of project cost) aims at the development of 1 500 ha in 10 - 15 schemes, providing flood control, tidal drainage and irrigation. Schemes are surrounded by protection dykes (riverside and upland dykes) and include main, secondary and tertiary canals. Access tracks to the swamps will also be constructed. Water management within the schemes would be based on simple principles. World Food Programme (WFP) will provide compensation food rations to farmers unable to produce due to construction work, and food for work to the farmers involved in building the main structures. Construction at tertiary levels and operations and maintenance of the schemes are the responsibility of beneficiaries. The distribution of schemes over the Northern Bank and Southern Bank of the River in MID depends on actual farmers demand.

Support to rice farming systems (17% of project cost) includes a demonstration and extension programme to promote the replacement of traditional rice varieties by High Yielding Varieties (HYVs); to improve nursery techniques and fertilizer use efficiency; and to promote horticultural crops. A trials programme will identify the most appropriate land preparation methods using animal traction; test labour-saving equipment for women, and test and select appropriate improved rice varieties. Credit and Women's Group Development (23% of project cost) will support a short-and medium-term credit programme to be implemented by The Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU), together with the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) ActionAid The Gambia (AATG), responsible for group formation and training. Groups will be trained in credit management, water management, operation and maintenance of schemes and in literacy. Day care centers will facilitate the work of women in the swamps, and an Annual Consultation on tidal rice production will provide beneficiaries, project staff and implementation agencies a participatory forum to assess project progress and discuss relevant issues.

The project is implemented under the responsibility of the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR). The project is integrated in the Ministry and day-to-day management is the task of the Divisional Agricultural Coordinator (DAC) in the southern part of MID (renamed senior DAC). A small Project Support Team, including technical assistance in irrigation engineering, agronomy and group formation and six counterpart staff, will assist the senior DAC in implementation. A subsidiary loan agreement has been signed between the government, GCU and ActionAid for the implementation of the credit programme. The Appraisal specified only in broad terms the main design features of the M&E system which would be the joint responsibility of DOP of MANR and the Senior DAC. Participatory M&E was strongly emphasized.

Expected effects and assumptions

The principal direct result from the project would be an increase in production of rice by 4 550 tons. This incremental production would increase household food security, income and, in a relatively minor way, reduce imports. About 830 tons of this production would be from a dry season crop (double cropping), thus improving the food supply position during the hungry season. The Economic Rate of Return was estimated at 16% . Project activities would also reduce women labour requirements for rice production. Unquantified benefits would include income generated from horticulture crops and non-farm enterprises, improved health and reduction of malnutrition. The annual consultation mechanisms would help establish participatory approaches and increase understanding of problems faced by women as lowland rice producers.

Project's design implied a number of assumptions including: (i) rice is the major element of food security in the project area; (ii) replacing local varieties by HYVs is an essential requirement for increased rice production; (iii) the main constraint to improvement in rice productivity in the tidal swamps is lack of water control; (iv) full water control is feasible and is essential for using HYVs; (v) the use of labour intensive technology in building water control infrastructure is feasible and will guarantee sustainability; (vi) full farmers' participation in selection implementation and evaluation of projects' activities; (vii) water management within the irrigation schemes is a simple process and smooth operations by farmers groups should be easy and feasible after a short training period, and (viii) cooperation between the project government and non-government institutions is feasible and forthcoming.

Evaluation

An interdisciplinary mission visited the field for a period of three weeks (five weeks for the sociologist) and held discussions with project's staff, implementing agencies and beneficiaries. A Rapid Rural Assessment (RRA) was undertaken in the project area, with beneficiaries participation, to assess project's effects/impact and beneficiaries views as of MTE. The MTE was preceded by a field preparatory phase carried out by an irrigation engineer to assess in detail the technical issues and results of the water control component.

Implementation context

An Economic Recovery Programme has been launched since the mid 1980's to deregulate the economy, eliminate price distortions and achieve external and internal balance. The programme yielded dividends at macro and sectoral level, but the country remains highly dependent on food imports (especially rice) and external assistance. The government is increasingly realizing that the interest of the poor should be safeguarded, and formulated in 1994 a Strategy for Poverty alleviation based on the findings of a National Dialogue on the relevant issues. Uplands crops continue to be more profitable than rice, whose market price is low due to extensive (unregulated) imports of broken rice. Rice growing is still essentially a subsistence crop and is the domain of women. Only small amounts of surplus rice is sold to satisfy immediate cash needs at whatever market price.

Project achievements

Overall objectives. At MTE and just one and half years to loan closing date, all project objectives have been only partially achieved. As of mid 1995, only 300 ha (of which 200 at Dankunku) have been brought under some sort of water control, representing a meager 20% of Appraisal estimates. The number of beneficiaries cultivating plots covered by water control has been estimated at 1 100, i.e., 27% of Appraisal targets. The credit component has just been initiated prior to the MTE and both income generating activities and crop diversification have had limited success. No benefits seem to have been incurred in other areas of MID. Despite such modest achievement of objectives disbursement of IFAD loans amounted to 76% up to the same period.

Scheme selection and implementation delays. The Appraisal Report indicated that scheme development should start in Dankunku although the site does not fully meet the criteria for scheme selection. In addition to delays in starting construction activities severe soil problems (potential acid sulphate, salinity and unsuitability for construction) caused major complications (sinking, shrinkage and fissuring of dykes) requiring repeated project intervention which led to spending a major share of project resources and time in this scheme. Moreover, beneficiaries' participation in Dankunku was not forthcoming partly because they were not consulted at the scheme design stage. Development of other schemes was consequently delayed. At MTE only five engineering schemes had been equipped with water control works. Total area benefiting from some sort of water control was just under 300 ha (of which about 200 at Dankunku). The rate of construction covering approximately 100 ha/year is far less than that stipulated at Appraisal. In four additional sites flood protection is in progress. This brings the total area potentially under "water control" in the current schemes to about 500 ha, i.e., 33% of Appraisal estimates. No activities were undertaken on the Northern Bank of the River.

Water control and scheme size. Repeated subsidence, cracking of the dykes hence flooding at Dankunku prevented water control and was partly responsible for severe crop failure in 93/94. These problems while particularly acute at Dankunku, also exist in other sites. At MTE, in none of the schemes was water control and management effective (in the sense of securing a standing level of 10 cm of water in the field) to allow for the plantation of semi-dwarf HYVs as stipulate at Appraisal. Due to high salinity levels, even with good water control double cropping will never be possible at Dankunku and the potential for yield increase will remain limited. Construction speed and participation of beneficiaries in other schemes were better than in Dankunku. Due to labour shortage only 49% of the developed area could be cropped; such shortage decreases the ability of existing beneficiaries to maintain the schemes. Scheme size proposed at appraisal (100-200 ha) proved too large to manage and the project introduced some corrective measures to adapt scheme size. Lessons drawn from the Dankunku experience have led the project to adopt a two stage approach in construction which seems to respond better to farmers needs but will take a long time for fine-tuning water control and management.

Water management. Water management, which takes place at three levels simultaneously (field, tertiary unit, and scheme level), proved much more complex than was foreseen at Appraisal. The project established a three tier organizational structure. The smallest units are the Water Users Groups (WUGs) which include farmers working adjacent plots in one swamp; followed by Swamp Development Committees (SDCs) at swamp level to oversee water management issues; and Local Management Committees (LMCs) which include representatives of all villages involved in one scheme (which can include several swamps) to resolve cross cutting and policy issues. By MTE, 24 WUGs, 5 SDCs and 3 LMCs were established. None of these groups are yet working properly and both project staff and beneficiaries are unclear about responsibilities and work modalities. The extent of training requirements for water management was not anticipated at Appraisal and the project did not undertake appropriate activities for this purpose. A swamp model has been constructed near the project office, but only 50 women have been trained in the basics of swamp water management and no field follow-up training was undertaken.

Food for work. WFP had foreseen support to swamp development, amounting to 348 400 man-days in 1992-94 and covering 700 ha to be developed. By May 1995, only 60 700 man-days had been utilized, mostly because construction was more machine-intensive than initially estimated (the project having to replace beneficiaries); the resort to hired labour to replace voluntary work and because of the limited area developed. Food aid for compensation of produce lost during construction work amounted to 152.5 tons against 113.4 tons planned. This was due to the project decision to compensate farmers for the loss of the 1993-94 crop in Dankunku.

Support to farming systems. Implementation of the trials and demonstration programme has been delayed by the late development of the schemes. The planned activities outside the schemes were not implemented. Demonstration work on farmer's fields has included the distribution for the 1994/95 season to 629 farmers of 3 101 kg of seed of four improved varieties which had been previously tested and selected by farmers. However, the distribution programme has not been adequately monitored. A small programme of mini-kit demonstrations has been undertaken with 148 farmers on 10.4 ha. Results are not available. Other demonstrations involved improved nursery techniques, line transplanting, fertilizer applications and vegetable growing and were attended by 900 farmers. The project undertook only some demonstrations (no trials) in the use of oxen ploughing in the swamps. No trials of other labour savings equipment for women were undertaken. Controlled trials have been undertaken only in the field of varietal selection, improved crop husbandry and fertilizer effectiveness; trials on improved varieties were successful and some interesting results were observed with respect to yields response to fertilizer and improved cultural practices. Overall however results recorded were unstable and yields reported were inconsistent and unreliable. Shortage of extension staff prevented widespread interaction with farmers.

Credit and women's droup development. The implementing agency for credit, GCU, has been suffering financial and managerial problems for quite some time. It reluctantly initiated a small inputs loan programme in April 1994 and distributed some loans for income-generating activities to women groups. Results were not encouraging with recovery of the inputs loans at 51%. Collaboration between GCU and the NGO, AATG in training of credit groups did not materialize because of differences in approach with the NGO (which does not apply interest on its own credit programme) and of lack of communication, motivation and follow-up. Savings groups were established by the project both in swamp villages and non-swamp villages more successfully. A total of 36 groups were formed with 2 241 members, of whom 2 003 or 89% are female. Savings were intended to serve as down payments for GCU operations; as these were not forthcoming it has been used for lending among group members, but no information on performance of such loans is available. Training by AATG in credit management, literacy, leadership and group formation was inadequate and insufficient. AATG decided unilaterally to withdraw from the project after an internal evaluation in 1995.

Participation. The Appraisal Report left the precise modalities for the organization of beneficiary participation undefined, stating that this would be left to the farmers themselves. Severe implementation delays were encountered in forming beneficiaries groups. Identification of women farmers actually cultivating in the swamps, obtaining land owners agreement on the list of land users, re-allocation of plots due to infrastructure construction, and farmers cultivating several plots spread over the swamp, were all factors that upset the initial attempts to set up WUGs. These groups were only established after scheme construction. During scheme design and construction, no real participatory framework existed except for the LMCs which represent the interests of the land owners. The Annual Consultations provided the only forum for beneficiary participation so far.

Two annual consultations were held. The first, in 1994 was confrontational with Dankunku beneficiaries blaming their 1993/94 crop losses (70% to 90%) on faulty design of the scheme leading to increased salinity in their fields. As a result of the consultation the project commissioned a study on salinity within the scheme. The MTE investigated this matter very closely and concluded that other factors were primarily responsible for crop failure. The return to pre-project output level in 1994/95 season reassured the farmers. The second Consultation in 1995 allowed farmers to visit schemes other than Dankunku and made them aware of their potential benefits. Both meetings served as a useful review forum and an outlet for participatory assessment by project beneficiaries. The implication of these consultations for project design and implementation still needs to be worked out.

Monitoring and evaluation. The project's M&E Unit was established only in 1993 with one staff seconded from DOP of MANR and five enumerators. The qualifications of the M&E officer is not commensurate with the job requirements as broadly defined in project design and usually expected in donor-supported projects. This is partly due to shortage of qualified staff at DOP hence its reluctance to send the few available on secondment. The training provided by DOP and the project to the M&E Officer is insufficient to close the gap and the incentives provided for Unit staff are also insufficient for adequate motivation. The Unit has so far exclusively emphasized the monitoring of physical progress based on data collection and compilation of a large number of quantitative indicators. These have been at times confusing and contradictory and were not always developed in consultation with other project staff. No attempt was made to measure the qualitative aspect of project services nor their impact on beneficiaries. Participatory monitoring of project progress envisaged at appraisal was not undertaken.

The work of the Unit has been useful to management only in cases where the planned values of indicators could be made available to compare with achieved values. Due to the absence of coherent annual work plans for some components, lack of awareness of the importance of M&E and lack of effective cooperation with the M&E Unit, the planned values, in many instance, could not be obtained. The Unit also suffers from inadequate levels of computerization and irregular flow of information on field programme of work and a number of logistic difficulties. Some duplication of work between enumerators of the M&E Unit and enumerators of other components and low level of coordination of field work also exist. This often resulted in contradictory and inconsistent data.

Project management. In the course of implementation a substantial volume of additional staff (38 incremental positions) over the initial 29 foreseen, has been recruited for the Project Support Team. A full scale PCU and a M&E Unit, charged against the IFAD loan, have been set up. This is contrary to the original design feature of integrating project management into the divisional ministerial structure. The senior DAC, assigned the responsibility of day-to-day management, is also responsible for the Ministry's current work programme as well as for activities foreseen under some other donors' supported projects. Therefore, he is only available on a part time basis for the project which has impaired effective management. This was compounded by low level of cooperation, coordination and communication between senior project staff. The project has incurred high levels of operating cost, caused by, among others, excessive vehicle use. Programming and budgeting is not undertaken in a manner which allows financial and physical progress monitoring. Expenditures are authorized on the basis of overall availability of funds in the IFAD loan categories rather than a well defined work programme. The accounting systems has been computerized but the programme used is complicated and does not correspond to the needs of the project.

Supervision reports have been very detailed and adequate analysis was undertaken of many relevant issues. Frequency and regularity of supervision have been according to IFAD/OPS agreement and composition of the missions has been overall well balanced, except perhaps for some lack of emphasis on sociological factors in project implementation. However, execution of recommendations often fell far short of the intended result and the Cooperating Institution and IFAD do not seem to have defined a clear formula for the consequences to the non-adherence to supervision recommendations. During the course of implementation and supervision, four different Project Controllers in IFAD assumed successively responsibility for the project. This may also have contributed to the lack of adequate response from IFAD's side to supervision recommendations and to a number of technical issues raised during implementation.

Effects assessment and sustainability

Results of the Rapid Rural Assessment undertaken by the mission reveal some positive effects of the project on women rice producers in the swamps developed after Dankunku; benefits varied by swamps and villages. These include improved access roads, increased protection from bush pigs, increased rice yields, improved food security and increased unity and participation in the village. Overall, women rice cultivators continue to be the main recipients of project services in the developed schemes, but little has been done to improve their living standards and household food security through labour-saving equipment, income-generating activities or credit. The crucial problem faced by the project is the sustainability of structures, schemes' operations and project benefits.

Household food security has been assumed to increase as a direct function of increasing rice production. A major finding of the MTE's RRA is that for most beneficiaries household food security is not exclusively based on rice nor on other commodities. Household food security is envisaged as an overall management-strategy used to maximize and renew household resources, ascertain self-sufficiency and maintain physical and mental well being for household members. A large number of factors interplay to determine the household behaviour in this respect including the gender and ethnic dimensions, age distribution within the household, characteristics of the cereals in the staple food basket, access to land social services and income generating activities, ... etc. Hence, the narrow focus of the project (rice) has been a limiting factor in effectively reducing food insecurity. Even with respect to rice production, as such, project's effects have been modest. Only two cropping seasons were experienced under the project in Dankunku and one season in the other 3 schemes where construction is almost complete. Because of crop failure in Dankunku in 93/94, the small area cultivated in the other swamps, and the limited crop intensity due to labour shortage, the overall increment in rice production by the time of MTE has been limited. Some improvement can be expected with the development of the post Dankunku schemes with higher potential for better yields and double cropping.

The use of HYVs. The need to replace local varieties by fertilizers responsive HYVs was assumed imperative in increasing rice production. It became therefore the driving force in shaping other design features specifically full water control requirements, water management, and credit for inputs. Mission analysis of project's effects point out that under the soil characteristics of the swamps in MID and keeping the capital intensity of the technology at a reasonably low level, full water control can never be achieved. Therefore semi dwarf HYVs cannot be efficiently used. MTE analysis of trial results indicates that, if improved cultural practices are adopted by farmers, including the use of improved varieties adapted to incomplete water control, paddy yields will respond positively even without fertilizers application. Tests on fertilizers application indicate that their effects are not significant and that improved husbandry practices (plant densities, age of seedlings, row transplanting ... etc) are more determining factors for paddy yields/. While the project has successfully identified five improved varieties of seeds, adoption is so far limited due to poor extension efforts.

Sustainability of structures. The sites chosen to start construction (Dankunku) did not fulfil the technical criteria specified at appraisal with respect to soil characteristics and acidity hence the repeated problems encountered and lower than expected results. Political considerations played an important role in this choice. If the technical considerations were strictly adhered to this site would not have been included among projects schemes. Overall, the technical difficulties for construction under tidal conditions have been underestimated hence the project target of developing 1 500 ha is far too optimistic and cannot be realized. Shrinkage, fissuring and sinking of dykes in the swamps conditions are likely to continue for a long time and unless continuous repair and maintenance is done sustainability of the structures is greatly at risk. Beneficiaries participation is below expectation and even tertiary channels are not systematically dug by farmers let alone their willingness to maintain it. These considerations render sustainability of the structures a doubtful matter. Overall, the technology proposed does not seem justified given the technical and socio-economic conditions prevailing in the lowlands of MID.

Sustainability of scheme operations. Scheme sustainability is severely threatened by the absence of appropriate water management by farmers. The assumption of smooth operations of schemes by farmers proved unrealistic. In effect the project introduces a completely new method of rice growing. It constitutes a change from a very extensive, low-input, individual farming system, to a complex, more intensive higher-input and cooperative system. Water management in this new environment is an intricate operation. It requires coordination and synchronization of actions between scheme users. Such cooperation is a new dimension in farming tradition and need to be gradually acquired. Training for water management has not been adequate nor sufficient. Progress has been hampered by lack of staff trained in water management. By MTE, no operation and maintenance manuals were available, neither for staff nor for the farmers. The Water Control Unit prepared technical specifications for operation and maintenance, but this has not been disseminated to farmers by the Group Development Unit. Hardly any maintenance is performed in the schemes (the only maintenance done was performed by the project). The results are clearly visible and the status of the dykes and canals are quite poor. Some technical factors also complicate water management in the swamps, e.g. the small tidal range and the extended transplanting period from September till December. No training of farmers to shorten this period took place. Lack of clarity as to respective responsibilities of various farmers groups and lack of effective participation by direct water users limited progress in water management. The three tier system established by the project is still ambiguous, ineffective and lack appropriate representation.

Household cash income for beneficiaries in swamps other than Dankunku has increased as a result of the project but no quantitative estimates was possible due to lack of baseline data. In project households rice sales make up 30% of women's cash income as against 16% in non project household where the bulk of cash income comes from groundnuts. MTE findings also indicate that: (i) the amount of income earned from rice cultivation for women is highly dependent on the type of labour system they use i.e. whether they pay for labour in cash or reciprocal labour; (ii) proportion of rice sold immediately after harvest or later in season; and (iii) whether rice is sold to meet an immediate cash shortfall or as a petty trade business.

Extension effects: the assurance in the loan agreement with respect to the pasting of extension workers was not respected. As a result the extension impact of the project has been extremely limited in spite of an obvious potential for improvement in cropping techniques and the existence of demand for advice by project's farmers. The accademic nature of many of the trials undertaken and unreliable data on the results limited the efficiency of whatever extension efforts were made. Following demonstrations (for ?) the use of ox ploughing farmer's expectations have been raised while the socio-economic and organizational feasibility of the use of oxen has not been confirmed. Nor was credit forthcoming to allow for financing this activity. Women expected therefore that ox ploughing would be done for them by the project. According to recipients of improved seeds the germination quality was not satisfactory. Due to the lack of an extension follow-up and advice, many women mixed the seeds with those of their own traditional varieties and planted the crop all over their plots in an effort to minimize risks. Improved seeds were therefore used outside the project schemes as well as for consumption.

Beneficiaries participation. The sequence of recruiting technical experts (first the engineers followed with delays, by the sociologists) meant that engineering work preceded group mobilization hence precluding from the start participation in design. Even when farmers participated in initial discussions of design features, most often engineers based their design on technical criteria. The situation in schemes developed after Dankunku is somewhat better as some attempt is made for group mobilization prior to construction. During implementation it appeared that beneficiaries motivation is less than anticipated due to several reasons: project improvements involve only some of the rice plots actually cultivated by women; benefits of the projects are not fully understood by the beneficiaries; beneficiaries investment (labour) benefit more the land owner who may decide any time to re-allocate the plot to another farmer, and in the first schemes the aid-dependency syndrome has negatively effected beneficiaries willingness to contribute labour. Uncertainty about project's effects created apprehension by the land owners and community leaders; influencing beneficiaries attitude. This required the intervention of the Minister of agriculture to reassure land owners that their rights will be preserved. LMCs remain dominated by village traditional leaders and influential men, and tend to reflect the interests of land owners rather than users. Homogeneity of ethnic background has not been always observed in group formation. Nevertheless, in some of the most recently developed schemes when benefits became more apparent after the first season, incentives to participate have been higher than earlier schemes.

General impact on women. As meant at design, women represent the bulk of project beneficiaries. The division of labour between men and women does not seem to have been affected by the project, as men's upland crops remain more remunerative than swamp rice in the wet season. Dry season double cropping of rice is more attractive to men than women, the latter being occupied in more rewarding income-generating activities in the uplands. Project development did not seem to have had any effect on mitigating the existing power structure but, so far, no land tenure issues arose and women do not perceive this as a problem. However, most schemes are still in a development stage with fine-tuning of the tertiary infrastructure requiring more time. The risk therefore remains, that after completing of all development work, if rice cultivation becomes more profitable, men could take over swamp land from current women cultivators. This aspect should be monitored closely.

Impact on women's non-farm income and labour time. Overall, the impact of the project in this area has been modest. While women are the focus for credit and income-generating activities, the programme has been limited in coverage and in the identification of potential product market. Knowledge of credit management remains very weak among beneficiaries and most women do not have exposure to borrowing and repaying with market interest rates. The credit initiated recently by GCU was not preceded nor associated with careful and well designed training and monitoring to ensure economic viability and social feasibility. Women did not benefit from labour savings farm equipments most of which is still owned by men. The only project intervention which had significant positive effects on women labour time is the construction and upgrading of access roads, which reduced substantially the required travel time to reach the swamps avoiding difficult spots where women had to walk through often waist-high water. The easier access to the swamps has modified the need for organized day care centres as women can leave their children in the villages for a shorter time with household elders.

While female membership overall in LMCs amounts to 60% (still less than the percentage of women in beneficiaries), the crucial advisors to these committees are the influential, religious and traditional male leaders. SDCs and WUGs with presumably more operational duties have a higher female membership but remain largely ineffective. Women training on group formation, leadership and literacy, was too short, misfocussed and irregular to be effective. Language and ethnic characteristics of communities are not fully considered in assigning trainers. The training of the latter was equally ineffective.

Economic rate of return. At Appraisal, using optimistic assumptions about yields, use of oxen traction by beneficiaries and labour savings equipment the ERR has been estimated at 16%, base case. No update of the ERR could be made due to the lack of reliable yield estimates. However, by the end of the project, about 500 ha are likely to be developed against a project assumption of 1 500 ha. Assuming all other parameters unchanged, which in reality will not be the case, the ERR will already be reduced to about one-third of the initial estimate.

Finally, the mission's assessment reveals that a number of assumptions made at Appraisal were unrealistic. These refer in particular to: (i) the capacity of MANR at divisional level to undertake the day-to-day administration and supervision of project activities; (ii) the technical feasibility of introducing full water control in tidal swamps with the proposed technology, and hence of the feasibility of promoting the use of the semi-dwarf high yielding rice varieties; (iii) the necessity of using fertilizers to increase paddy yields; (iv) effective inter-institutional cooperation; (v) capacity and financial viability of the designated credit institution (vi) labour availability to cultivate all plots brought under water control; (vii) suitability of machinery inherited from JPSP to undertake construction work in tidal swamp conditions; (viii) the sustainability of major labour intensive water control infrastructure in swamps conditions; and (ix) simplicity and cultural acceptability of water management practices and the ease of dissemination of these practices through various farmers' groups.

Main issues and recommendations

Modifying implementation strategy to maximize impact. Because of the modest achievements of the Project so far, the non-realism of a number of design features and the limited time and resources remaining, the mission recommended modifying the implementation strategy of the Project to consolidate project activities and sharpen its focus on achieving its central objective i.e., increasing rice, production and income of women producers, and enhancing scheme sustainability. A three pronged strategy is proposed: (i) consolidation of water control work and stressing completion of ongoing construction work; (ii) implementation of an intensive extension programme targeting improved agronomic practices and adoption by women farmers of identified technical packages; and (iii) implementation of a focused and relevant training programme directed at farmers and their groups in existing schemes to improve their ability in water management and in operations and maintenance of structures.

To operationalize the above mentioned strategy, an Immediate Action Plan (IAP) has been proposed by the mission consisting of the following main elements (for details see chapter VII Reccommendations):

(i) activities in water control and management should be consolidated and should focus exclusively on the completion of work in the swamps currently protected against floods, and those where work has already started (a total of nine swamps). No expansion beyond these nine swamps should be undertaken. No work in the North Bank of the River Gambia should be initiated. All in all a total of 500 ha would be brought under water control up to the end of 1996 (33% of appraisal estimates);

(ii) no further investments should be made in civil works in the Dankunku swamps using IFAD funds beyond what is included in the consolidation plan and the recent agreement reached between the project and the beneficiaries;

(iii) consolidate and streamline the existing Farming System and Group Development Units into one single organizational structure under the name of Scheme Support Services (SSS). The SSS will exclusively emphasize activities that have the largest and most direct impact on increasing rice yields, production and scheme sustainability. These consist of intensive extension efforts to disseminate relevant technical packages to specific swamp conditions and focused relevant training in group formation and water management covering both beneficiaries as well as Project staff;

(iv) given MTE mission's assessment of GCU capabilities and its financial viability and taking into account remaining implementation time, the mission recommends to immediately halt all further funding of GCU activities from IFAD resources and to reorient Project-supported savings groups towards existing savings and loan schemes in the Project area such as VISACA;

(v) the Project's M&E unit should consolidate and improve the existing system. This would require reducing and streamlining the monitoring indicators with some emphasis on qualitative performance; allowing for local training of the M&E officer; supporting the unit with a larger computer capacity and reducing its field staff; and

(vi) to strengthen the weak project management and implement the Immediate Action Plan in an efficient manner, external managerial support is needed. The task of this support will include the rationalization of project staffing, the restructuring of project organization and overseeing the implementation of the action plan.

8. Follow up on the MTE recommendations

The Immediate Action Plan proposed by the MTE mission was approved by the Government, IFAD and the Cooperating Institution for immediate implementation. In September 1995, a UNOPS/IFAD follow-up mission was fielded to ensure that the IAP is being adequately implemented and that the project is concentrating on the identified priorities. The mission suggested and GOTG agreed to set up a Project Management Working Group (PMWG) to oversee the implementation of the IAP and to ensure the integration of the project activities and services into the national structure upon completation of the project. The PMWG is chaired by the Director of DAS with senior representatives from DOP, SWMU, NARI and VISACAs, and would meet on a quarterly basis at project headquarter. As of July 1996 the PMWG had met three times. In support for project management capacity to implement the IAP the UNOPS/IFAD mission mentioned above recommended two short-term consultancies to be carried out during 1996: (i) to support improved agronomic practice for rice cultivation (undertaken in early 1996) and (ii) to support the M&E unit in the preparation of final impact surveys (to be mounted in the third quarter of 1996).

Lessons learned

Household food security: Beneficiaries perception of household food security is much more complex than what is usually perceived by project designers and is not exclusively based on commodities. It is a multidimensional resource-management strategy applied to optimize the use of households resources and generate sufficient food and income to satisfy the diversified needs of all members of the household. Such strategy varies by gender, ethnic background, age groups and access to assets, services and income generating activities. Standardized yardsticks for food security, often based on a single food crop, used to assess it or design interventions to achieve it are therefore inadequate.

Characteristics of the swamps soil and the need for location specific technology. The characteristics of swamp soils in the Gambia, and perhaps elsewhere, are location specific and vary greatly with the pattern of tidal flows, underground water movement and chemical content. New technologies should not therefore be applied uniformly to all swamp areas; they should be preceeded by location specific investigations to determine the relevant technical parameters and the most suitable technological interventions.

The impact of technology and the need for a pilot phase. When investment projects introduce technologies which require a significant change in communities way of life and cultivation practices, the uncertainties hence risks of failure are high enough to justify the emphasis on simpler technologies involving the improvement of existing practices without large variations in farming and community traditions. Meanwhile a limited "pilot phase" intervention could be undertaken to fully test the implication of the new technology and its sustainability, prior to wider replication.

Effective participation and the sequence of intervention. When the construction of irrigation structures involves temporary production loss, and water management requires new forms of social organization, mobilization of beneficiaries is a crucial element in implementation. However, the sequence of intervention will be the determinant factor for effective participation hence probabilities of success; group mobilization should start first followed by engineering work, and not the reverse. Such sequence would ensure full appreciation of project's benefits by group members; participation of beneficiaries in the design of the schemes and assuring traditional leaders that their rights will not be threatened by the project. Without the latter assurance, beneficiaries attitude can be easily influenced against the project.

Labour intensity of technology and scheme sustainability. The choice of labour intensive technology for water control infrastructure is not a complete guarantee for sustainability. For these two factors to coincide the following conditions should materialize: (a) the benefits of these infrastructure should be fully demonstrated to the beneficiaries; (b) the opportunity cost of labour should be lower than the expected benefits (including food for work when necessary); (c) maintenance of structures, scheme operations and water management should not be intensive or complex, but relatively simple and for which the beneficiaries have received adequate training; and (d) beneficiaries ownership of the schemes should be ensured through appropriate and timely processes of participation.

Modalities of participation At face value it might seem correct to leave it to beneficiaries to decide on the modalities of their organization for operation and maintenance of irrigation schemes, as this reflects a true participatory approach. In reality project staff will need to provide a basic outline for such organizations, ready to be modified according to beneficiary needs. In SSWCP, much time and effort have been spent on this issue and external political intervention was required to resolve it. The large representation of land owners in the crucial committees, hence their influence, could have been mitigated by more farmer presence from the start, guided by the project. If the project had prepared such guidelines this would have facilitated the structuring of committees accordingly.

Management modalities While integrating project management in existing ministerial structures assures uniformity in implementation modalities, it tends to encourage, under retrenchment programmes, direct hiring by the project of additional personnel. This may lead to the creation of a full Project Management Unit (PMU) when: a) appraisal of the effective implementation capacity of the Ministry is not undertaken properly and the ministry's capacity is overestimated; b) additional staff, over and above Appraisal estimates, are assigned to the project, constituting a separate support unit for the project manager; and c) ministry staff working for the project request and receive specific project allowances, distinguishing them from other Ministry staff and creating an unforeseen burden on the project budget. The argument for integration: assuring sustainability after the project, does not therefore hold. An autonomous PMU well defined from the start might have operated more effectively and efficiently.

Technical versus political considerations. Implementation of the project from the beginning has been subject to political considerations. This started with Identification and Appraisal decisions to include Dankunku in the project although it did not meet the criteria set by the Appraisal. Possibly, the insistence on GCU involvement in the project is the result of similar political considerations. Prevalence of political over technical considerations results in delays in implementation and misallocation of project resources away from intended beneficiaries. In such situations IFAD and CI should provide sufficient countervailing power to protect the interests of the genuine target group.

Implementation of supervision recommendations. Regular supervision of the project resulted in frequent recommendations for improved implementation; they were accepted by government during wrap-up meetings at the end of each supervision mission. Many of such recommendations were not implemented or were only partially followed up. Lack of implementation or late implementation of recommendations had no consequences for project management nor for the Borrower, thereby nurturing further the laxed attitude of project management. Effective application of sanctions after repeated non-compliance might have avoided some of the problems encountered during implementation.